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## Chapter Six

CONTRIBUTION TO THE GENERAL THEORY OF CASE:  
GENERAL MEANINGS OF THE RUSSIAN CASES

## I

The question of the **general meanings** [*Gesamtbedeutungen*] of grammatical forms is naturally basic to the theory of the grammatical system of language. The importance of this question was fundamentally clear to linguistic thinking associated with the systematist philosophical currents of the first half of the last century, but a comprehensive solution was not possible without further independent development and refinement of linguistic methodology. However, the following period of research chose rather to push the problem aside; mechanistically oriented linguistics relegated general meanings to the Index. As the history of the matter is not part of my task, I confine myself to a few illustrative examples.

The well-known Russian linguist Potebnja rejects the doctrine of a grammatical general meaning as something out of which particular meanings [*Sonderbedeutungen*] proceed as accident, asserting rather that the "general meaning" is a mere abstraction, an artificial construct "no more than a product of individual thought and having no real existence in language". Neither language nor linguistics require such general meanings. In language, there are only individual instances of a form, and each instance of the form possesses, in speech, only one unanalyzable meaning, "that is, stated more precisely, it is a different form in each instance". The various individual uses of the word are for Potebnja simply "similar-sounding words of one and the same family", and all their meanings are "equally partial and equally essential" (33 f.). The disavowal of general meanings is thus taken to an extreme — indeed, to the point of a total and unrevealing **atomization** of linguistic phenomena.

Of course, attempts have been made to rescue the unitary notion of a grammatical form, without which morphology simply disintegrates. Here one tries to separate the form from its function, and especially the unity of a grammatical category from the uniformity of its meaning: thus, for example,

according to Marty, cases are "not vehicles of some general concept, but rather vehicles of an entire bundle of various meanings" (32 ff., Funke 57). As a consequence, **the relation between sign and meaning** is lost, and questions of meaning are wrongly eliminated from the theory of signs (semiology, and especially linguistic semantics). Semantics, the very core of linguistics and of any sign theory in general, is thus deprived of an object of inquiry, and we are left with such grotesque scholarly enterprises as a morphology which is absolutely oblivious of the meanings of forms.

Peškovskij, a prominent linguist of the Fortunatov school, attempted to maintain the semantic character of grammatical forms by proposing that the unity of forms is effected not only by a unitary meaning, but also by "a unitary bundle of various meanings that repeat themselves within each of these forms in the same way" (24 ff.). Thus, for example, the following are shown to be unified within one and the same category of case (the Russian instrumental): the meanings of implement, comparison, extension in space and time, which "have nothing in common" and yet constitute a grammatical unit, since these various meanings "are repeated with each form", so that any given instrumental ending serves to reproduce all its meanings. This characterization is inexact: in Russian adjectives, every masc. sg. instrumental ending falls together with the dative pl. ending (*zlym*, 'evil', *bož'im* 'God's'); every masc. sg. nominative ending in qualitative adjectives falls together with their fem. sg. genitive ending (*zloj* - *zloj*, *staryj* 'old' - *staroj*, *tixij* 'quiet' - *tixoj*, *sinij* 'blue' - *sinej*; the orthographic distinctions are artificial), and nevertheless in each of these cases the separateness of the grammatical categories is beyond question. These are merely pairs of homonymous forms, and if the individual meanings [*Einzelbedeutungen*] of a case really "had nothing in common", that case would inevitably disintegrate into several disconnected homonymous forms. Yet **the objective reality of case in language**, and, in contrast to this, the subjectivity of their dismemberment into individual meanings, is all too clear.

Peškovskij himself admits: "Determining the inventory of meanings for one and the same form and classifying these into central and marginal meanings is an unusually difficult task, one that is usually carried out in different ways by different scholars". Even though, as Peškovskij correctly concludes, it would be dangerous to separate the concept of the grammatical category from its objective reality — i.e. from its phonetically realized grammatical form — it would be just as inadvisable to separate the concept of the grammatical category from its objective value — i.e. from its meaning in the language ("langue") which distinguishes it from every other category.

While the question of the general meanings of grammatical forms had at least been broached in Russian theory of the verb — and this despite the superstitious dread on the part of atomistic thought before any problem involving a whole and its parts — the situation was much worse with the question of case meanings. It was not only the increased complexity of the problem that was responsible. Nominal inflection in the Germanic and Romance languages is purely a matter of insignificant relics. In describing the manifold uses of individual cases in ancient and foreign languages with well-developed declensional systems, Western linguists could hardly draw on their own linguistic behavior as a control. Thus the question of the existence of so seemingly useless a category as case was for the most part replaced by a mechanical list of a case's various individual meanings. Through just such fragmented descriptions, Western linguists also sought, more than once, to grasp the nature of Slavic verbal aspect. But aspect and many other properties of the verbal system are too specific to Russian and the other Slavic languages to allow entrance into Slavic linguistics of inappropriate Western definitions.

It has been otherwise with case theory, where models for the interpretation of the Slavic data were provided by the reputable fields of classical philology and Sanskrit studies. The fact that nominal inflection is relatively foreign to the Western languages is reflected in Western linguistics, and the influence of the latter alienated the problem of case from Slavic linguistics, despite the importance of declension in most Slavic language systems.<sup>1</sup> Such examples of erroneous and misleading application of foreign, Western criteria to indigenous phenomena are no rarity in Slavic studies.

## II

In the Festschrift *Charisteria G. Mathesio* . . . (1932: this volume, p. 1 ff.) I published one of my sketches of the structural grammar of modern Russian, in which I dealt with the general meanings of the Russian verb forms. The same principles underlie the present study of the Russian case system. Such a discussion seems to me all the more timely, since the question of the general meanings of cases has finally become the subject of lively and fruitful discussion.

At the International Congress of Linguists in Rome, 1933, M. Deutschbein delivered a lecture on "Meaning of the Cases in Indo-European" (see *Atti*), which contains some interesting observations on the system of basic meanings [*Grundbedeutungen*], but posits rigid basic meanings without bringing to

bear the full range of empirical data. The general meaning of each case is "determined by the entire case system of a given language" and can be established only by investigating the structure of this system; and hypotheses of general import can only be established through comparative analysis and typological studies of individual language structures. One cannot set up case meanings which are universally valid for all time and which are independent of a particular system (or system type) of case oppositions (see *Atti*, 146).

A considerable step forward toward a scientific solution to case was made by L. Hjelmslev's important book *La catégorie des cas* (1935). The subtle Danish linguistic theoretician draws on a rich native tradition for support: the far-sighted observations of the comparativists from Rask to Pedersen, stressing the need for a comprehensive comparative investigation of the various grammatical systems; Jespersen's broad-based struggle for immanent functional analysis; and especially the pioneering attempts of Brøndal to found a unified structural morphology. The importance of the new book lies in its critical overview of older case theories and in its clear and carefully thought out formulation of the problem. His major theses relate to the first-rate work of Wüllner, which anticipated them by centuries: "A grammar is a theory of basic meanings or values and of the system formed by means of them, and it must proceed empirically in accomplishing its task" (Hjelmslev, 84). With this formulation, Hjelmslev uncovers three central problems: **basic meaning**, **system**, and **empirical procedure**.

The first concept is clarified by the following definition: "A case, like linguistic units in general, does not mean several different things; it means one single thing — it carries a single abstract concept, from which concrete applications can be derived" (85). I take issue only with the term **basic meaning** (*signification fondamentale*), which can easily be confused with the designation **principal meaning** (*signification principale*), while what the author has in mind is more accurately expressed by the term **general meaning** (*signification générale*).

There can be no objection to the demand for an empirical (that is, immanent and language-internal) procedure; indeed, a more consistent application of such a procedure is called for. It is improper not only to keep apart that which from the linguistic point of view belongs together, but also to combine, artificially, that which from the linguistic point of view is separate. Not only two grammatical forms, but even two form classes, indicate a difference in value. The word in language is a functional unit, which differs fundamentally from a phrase. The form of the word and the form of the phrase represent distinct planes of linguistic value. One can therefore speak

not only of the difference between the general meanings of two case categories, but also of the difference between the **general meanings of the categories 'word' and 'phrase'**. I therefore doubt the correctness of Hjelmslev's assertion that "les distinctions faites par un ordre fixe des éléments agissent sur le même plan de relation que les distinctions faites par les formants casuels". ("The distinctions made by a fixed order of elements operate on the same level as the distinctions made by case forms".) For Russian the normal word order is subject, predicate, direct object: *otec ljubit syna* 'the father loves the son'; *syn ljubit otca* 'the son loves the father'. Inversion is permissible: *syna ljubit otec* 'the father loves the son'; "*žida naduet grek, a greka armjanin*" 'the Greek will cheat the Jew, and the Armenian the Greek'. Such an inversion indicates that the object is the starting point of the utterance and the subject its end point. The object may be the starting point either as a member of an antithesis or as a designation of an entity that is known from the preceding context or from the situation; or it may be the intention from the beginning to draw attention to this entity. In any event, the usual identity between the focus of the utterance (i.e. its subject) and the starting point of the sentence is violated. However, when the endings of both nouns in such a construction do not show their cases, the normal word order may not be violated. E.g.: *mat' ljubit doč'* 'the mother loves the daughter'; *doč' ljubit mat'* 'the daughter loves the mother' or in poetry "*strax gonit styd, styd gonit strax*" 'fear pursues shame, shame pursues fear'. On the basis of the word order, we know that 'fear' functions as the subject in the first case, and 'shame' in the second. In sentences like *otec ljubit syna, syna ljubit otec* the syntactic function of the nouns is suggested by their case form, but where the case form is unclear (*mat' ljubit doč'*), the function of the nouns in the sentence is determined by word order.<sup>2</sup> The latter completely takes over this function in uninflected languages. Yet we are not entitled to assert that word order can express case; word order can merely express the syntactic function of words, which is not at all the same thing. Brøndal correctly perceived that case is morphological and not syntactic in nature: "every case has its definition or 'function'; but there is no necessary relationship between a case function and a syntactic function; case theory and morphology are not syntax" (*Atti*, 146). Transferal of the question of the general meanings of case forms from morphology to syntax could only have occurred within a linguistic framework in which case was not a morphological category.

The system of **prepositional constructions** is also not interchangeable with nominal inflection, since those languages which possess both categories

first oppose the syntactic usages of a given case with a preposition to those without the preposition (indirect vs. direct connection), and then clearly differentiate between the meanings of the cases and those of the prepositions as two special types of meanings: one and the same case takes several prepositions, and the same preposition can require various cases. The so-called transition from an inflectional system to an analytic one is in fact a transition from the simultaneous existence of both an inflectional and analytic system to a monopoly of the latter. In a language which combines a system of prepositional constructions with an independent system of case the meanings in the two systems are differentiated in the sense that when prepositions are used the relation itself is focussed upon, while in constructions without prepositions the relation becomes a kind of property of the object denoted.

"One must counter atomistic procedure with an overall view which makes the system at once the starting point and the goal of research", Hjelmslev correctly writes, "but such an approach is far from a reality, and thus to date a theory of case has not been realized" (86 f.). That attempts to define individual cases in isolation are in vain, and that it is absolutely necessary to begin from a **general system of case oppositions**, follows as a natural conclusion from an immanent procedure (as opposed to an empirical one), which has no place for the meaning of form defined in isolation, existing independently of the system of linguistic oppositions. The essay on the general structure of a case system at the end of Hjelmslev's instructive book, which I hope to discuss in more detail after the appearance of the announced second volume, attempts to treat general meanings of case in the light of the case system as a whole. Here again, one cannot object in the slightest to Hjelmslev's programmatic statements; one could, however, object to the fact that the author does not sufficiently adhere to his own principles in his own concrete studies of case systems.

The fundamental question posed by Hjelmslev is this: what is the objective relationship between two grammatical categories, namely two cases, and in particular, how do their general meanings differ? — In the *Charisteria* I wrote:

"When a linguist investigates two morphological categories in mutual opposition, he often starts from the assumption that both categories should be of equal value, and that each of them should possess a positive meaning of its own: Category I should signify  $\alpha$ , while Category II should signify  $\beta$ ; or at least I should signify  $\alpha$ , and II the absence or negation of  $\alpha$ . In reality, the general meanings of correlative categories are distributed in a different way: If Category I signals the existence of  $\alpha$ , then Category II does not signal

the existence of  $\alpha$ , i.e. it does not say whether  $\alpha$  is present or not. The general meaning of the unmarked Category II, as compared to the marked Category I, is restricted to the lack of ' $\alpha$ -signalization' (74)". [See above, p. 1].

Hjelmslev acknowledges this principle: "La structure du système linguistique n'est pas telle qu'il soit possible de maintenir la distinction entre un terme positif et un terme négatif . . . L'opposition réelle et universelle est entre un terme défini et un terme indéfini" (101). ("The structure of the linguistic system does not allow the distinction between a positive term and a negative term to be maintained . . . The real and universal opposition is that between a definite term and an indefinite one".) But in his descriptions of individual case systems, for example that of the Gothic substantives, Hjelmslev deviates from the above guideline. Thus he defines the Gothic nominative and accusative, for example, as follows:

"Le nominatif désigne à la fois éloignement et rapprochement, puisqu'il est à la fois cas 'sujet' et cas 'prédicat': mais il insiste sur la face négative de la dimension parce que la valeur de 'sujet' prédomine. En outre le nominatif peut être neutre à l'égard de l'opposition; ainsi s'il est mis hors contexte ou s'il prend le rôle du vocatif. L'accusatif insiste sur la face positive de l'opposition parce que la valeur d' 'object' prévaut et est souvent la seule envisagée. En outre l'accusatif peut être neutre à l'égard de l'opposition comme c'est le cas lorsqu'il indique le temps, l'espace temporelle à l'intérieur de laquelle un fait est situé" (116 f.)

("The nominative designates at the same time distancing and approximation, since it is at the same time the case of the 'subject' and the case of the 'predicate': but it lays stress on the negative aspect of the dimension because the value of 'subject' predominates. Moreover, the nominative can be neutral with regard to the opposition, as when it is placed out of context or when it assumes the role of a vocative. The accusative lays stress on the positive aspect of the opposition because the value of 'object' predominates over the rest and is often the only one envisaged. Moreover, the accusative can be neutral with regard to the opposition, as is the case when it indicates time, the temporal space within which something is situated".)

Here, the problem of general meanings is clearly pushed aside, on the one hand, in favor of the traditional **list of individual meanings**, or of the list of syntactic functions of each of the two cases (e.g. nominative as the case of the subject and of the predicate, as a predicate-less form, and as an address-form) and, on the other hand, in favor of establishing the principal meaning of each case (in the nominative "the value of 'subject' predominates," while

in the accusative "the value of 'object' predominates and is often the only one envisaged"), although the author condemns such a procedure in principle (6 and *passim*).

The following sketches attempt to uncover the **morphological correlations** which constitute the system of modern Russian declension, to explicate on this basis the general meanings of the Russian cases, and thereby to contribute data for a future comparative theory of case.

### III

In comparing the Russian nominative and accusative, the first is frequently defined as a case denoting the subject of some action, and the second, the object of the action. Such a definition of the accusative is by and large correct. The accusative always indicates that some action to some extent affects, is directed at, or is manifested on, the stated entity. We have to do here then, with an "entity toward which an action is directed [*Bezugsgegenstand*]", in the terminology of Bühler (250).

This general meaning characterizes the two syntactic varieties of A (accusative): 1) The A defined by Peškovskij as "**strongly governed**" denotes either an **inner object** of the action, which originates as the result of the action (*pisat' pis'mo* 'to write a letter'), or an **outer object** of the action, subject to the effect of the action but also having prior existence independent of the action (*čitat' knigu* 'to read a book'). 2) A "**weakly governed**" A denotes a segment of time or space that is entirely encompassed by the action (*žit' god* 'to live a year', *idti verstu* 'to go one *verst*') or the **objectivized content of an utterance** (*gore gorevat* 'to suffer suffering', *šutki šutit* 'to jest a jest', *stoit' den'gi* 'to cost money'). The weakly governed A differs from the strongly governed A in that its content is **insufficiently objectivized and not sufficiently independent of the action**, so that it vacillates between the function of an object and the function of a circumstance of the action (an adverbial); it can be used with otherwise intransitive verbs; it cannot become the subject of a passive construction; and it can occur in a simple sentence together with a strongly governed A (*vsju [dorogu] menja mučila žažda* 'thirst tormented me the entire way'), while two strongly governed A's are not compatible.

The meaning of the A is connected with the action so closely and directly that it can be exclusively governed by a **verb** and its independent use always suggests a missing and implied verb: *karetu!* 'the carriage!' *nagradu xrabrym!*

'a reward to the brave!' In such accusative addresses as *Van'ku! Lizu!* (a call from a distance or an emphatic call widely used in dialects), or in such exclamations as *nu ego [A] k lešemu!* 'the devil with him!'; *pust' ego [A] kutit!* 'let him carouse'; "èk ego [A] zalivaetsja!" (Gogol) 'how he pours forth [song]!', the accusative object is portrayed as the **object of the speaker's attitude**, be it one of appeal, refusal, yielding, or admiration. The meaning of directedness is also linked to the prepositional A. Cf. such expressions as *na stol* 'onto the table' — *na stole* 'on the table', *pod stol* 'under the table' (directional) — *pod stolom* 'under the table' (locative), etc.

While the standard definition of the A is in general correct, the traditional characterization of the N (nominative) as the case denoting the acting subject leaves a series of applications of the N unaccounted for. In the sentence *vremja - den'gi* 'time is money' neither the subject N nor the predicate N is marked as active. In the sentence *syn nakazan otcem* 'the son has been punished by the father' the content of the N is that of the object of the action. The actual contrast between the A and the N consists merely in the fact that the A denotes the entity at which an action is directed, whereas the N by itself specifies neither the presence nor the absence of any directedness of an action.<sup>3</sup> **The statement of the existence of directedness [*Bezug*] is therefore the mark of the A as opposed to the N;** it follows that we treat the A as the marked member of a **directional correlation [*Bezugskorrelation*]** and the N as the unmarked member. The statements of the Hindu grammarians according to which the N contains nothing but the meaning of the nominal stem plus gender and number — an appropriate view, to which Delbrück is wrong in objecting that the N is not interpreted as the case of the subject (181) — are thus, as we have seen, valid for Russian.

In signaling the **dependent status of the object marked by the A**, the case form itself is relegated to a dependent role in the sentence, in contrast to the N, which by itself designates **no syntagmatic relationship**. The Russian N has often been correctly defined as a pure name of the entity, without the complications introduced by the other case forms (Peškovskij, 118); as the *cas zéro* (Karcevskij, *Système*, 18); in a word, as the unmarked case form. The fact that the N, in contrast to all other cases, does not limit in any way the role of the entity it designates (i.e. does not signify either its dependence upon an action or its incomplete presence in the content of the utterance, etc.) singles out this case in essence from all others and makes it the only possible vehicle of the **pure naming function**. The N directly names the entity while the other cases, according to Aristotle's apt definition, are "not names, but cases of the name". The naming function can be the sole

function of the N: the naming is simply linked to the given or imagined object. A sign announces: *buločnaja* 'bakery', *Revizor* 'The Inspector General' — this is the language of labels and headings. The speaker recognizes and names perceived objects (a visitor to the zoo: *medved*, *verbljud*, *lev* 'bear, camel, lion') and his own experiences (*xolod*, *toska* 'cold, melancholy'), or he calls forth imaginary things by naming them (for example, the poet Bal'mont: "Večer. Vzmor'e. Vzdoxi vetra". 'Evening. The seaside. Sighs of the wind'). The nominative functions in all these examples as a kind of predicate in relation to the state of affairs which exists outside the utterance either actually or fictively. )))

The N is the unmarked form for the naming function of the utterance. It functions also, however, as a part of the sentence which not only names the object, but imparts something more about it. Even in descriptive utterances the naming function of the N is always present, and even primary: the entity referred to by the N becomes the **topic of the sentence**. The incomplete blending of the naming function with the descriptive function is especially clear in cases like *osěl* [nominal sentence], *tot* [subject of a descriptive sentence] *ne trebuje bol'sogo uxoda* "the donkey, it doesn't require much care" (this construction is investigated most thoroughly on the basis of Czech data by Trávníček, *Věty*, 137 ff.). ! ]

The N can thus perform several syntactic functions in the same descriptive sentence, and the meanings of these various nominative constituents can differ as to their extent, yet the various constituents necessarily have one and the same referent, namely, **that referent which is designated by the subject of the sentence**. It is only in this sense that the thesis of the N as the case of the grammatical subject is appropriate (for Russian, e.g. see already Puchmayer, 259), for neither is the N the only expression of the subject (the subject can also be expressed by means of the genitive), nor is that of the subject the only syntactic function of the N (cf. the predicative N). 1) *Onegin — dobryj moj prijatel'* 'Onegin is my good friend', 2) "*Onegin, dobryj moj prijatel', rodilsja na bregax Nevy*" (Puškin) 'Onegin, my good friend, was born on the banks of the Neva'. The subject nominative and the predicate nominative in the first sentence have one and the same referent; likewise, in the second sentence, the subject and the apposition. Predication shows that the meaning of the predicate refers to the subject, while apposition (and attribution in general) shows merely that the meaning has some reference. Formally, only the mutual reference of two meanings is given by the "double N", and only the actual meanings of the nouns, or the entire context, suggests which of the two meanings is the determining one and which is the determin-

ed. Often, especially in poetic language, the difference between the subject and the nominal predicate (or, as the case may be, the appositive) is more or less obscured. Thus for example in Majakovskij's march: "*Naš bog* [P] *beg* [S]. *Serdce* [S] *naš baraban* [P]" 'Our God — the race. The heart — our drum'.

A peculiar syntactic perspective arises from the special status of the N: the referent that is in the nominative assumes the leading role in the sentence. Let us compare two sentences: *Latvija sosedit s Èstoniej* 'Latvia is bordered by Estonia' — *Èstonija sosedit s Latviej* 'Estonia is bordered by Latvia'. The content of the two sentences is identical, but in the first it is Latvia, in the second Estonia, that is the major focus of the assertion. Husserl, in the second volume of *Logische Untersuchungen* — the importance of which for language theory cannot be over-emphasized — analyzes such sentence pairs as "a is larger than b" and "b is smaller than a", and establishes that though the two sentences describe the same state of affairs, they differ in their semantic content (48). They are distinguished in terms of a **hierarchy of meanings**.

The lower rank of the accusative meaning on the scale of meanings in a sentence remains in force in subjectless sentences. The peculiarity of such sentences lies in the fact that without being deleted the **position of the main referent** is vacant. Syntactically we can speak of a "zero subject". *Soldata* [A] *ranilo v bok* 'the soldier was wounded in the side', *lodku* [A] *daleko otneslo* 'the boat was swept far away'. In the referentially identical sentences *soldat* [N] *ranen v bok*; *lodka* [N] *daleko otnesena* the referents designated by the N occupy the main position in the ranking. Use of the A in itself denotes that in the meaning hierarchy of the utterance something else is being more highly ranked, i.e. it implies, unlike the N, the **existence of a hierarchy of meanings**. Metaphorically speaking the A signals the lower ranking of a point, thus presupposing the existence above it of some other point (expressed or unexpressed) which is linked to the first; the A thus denotes the 'vertical' dimension of the utterance, while the N denotes nothing but a single point. When in a poem Andrej Belyj writes, instead of *ty vidiš' menja* [A] 'you see me', *ty vidiš' - ja* [N], he designates, syntactically, only two independent points, and thereby removes the hierarchy of meanings.

The question of the general meanings of cases belongs to morphology while the question of particular meanings belongs to syntax, since the general meaning of a case is independent of its environment, while its particular meanings are defined by various combinations of surrounding words involving both their formal and their real reference — the particular meanings are therefore, so to speak, **combinatory variants of the general meaning**. It would be

an over-simplification of the problem to restrict the investigation of case meanings to merely positing a set of particular meanings of a case and selecting an appropriate common name for these as a general meaning. The particular meanings, determined syntactically or phraseologically, are not a mechanical accumulation, but form rather a regular **hierarchy of particular meanings**. One must at all costs avoid replacing the question of the general meaning of a case with the question of its specific meaning or its principal meaning (as is often done); and, above all, we are not justified in denying the problem of the hierarchy of the particular meanings which are comprised by a general meaning. Principal meanings, as well as specific meanings of cases, are not intellectual fictions, but actual facts of language.

We have seen that two of the Russian cases are correlative; i.e. the general meaning of one case focusses upon the presence of a certain mark ( $\alpha$ ) of objective reality, while the general meaning of the other case is that neither the presence nor the absence of this mark is affirmed. In reference to the first we speak of a marked category; in reference to the second, of an unmarked category. From the fact that the categories are in opposition, it follows that the designation of the absence of a mark is the specific meaning of the unmarked case. If the general meaning of the N, as opposed to that of the A, does not specify whether or not the entity referred to is subject to any action (non-signalization of  $\alpha$ ), then the **specific meaning** [*spezifische Bedeutung*] of this case is that the utterance implies no such action (the signalization of non- $\alpha$ ; cf. *Charisteria*, 84). The N used independently has this meaning as well. But when the context indicates that the referent of the nominative is subject to an action (the signalization of  $\alpha$ ), then this combinatory meaning of the N, which coincides with the meaning of the accusative, is valued as an "improper" meaning. That specific meaning of the N which is in direct opposition to that of the correlative case – namely that of the acting subject or, better, the subject of a transitive action – is the **principal meaning** of the nominative. No other case could be used with this meaning. One says *detej* [G] *prišlo!* 'what a lot of children have come!'; *nikogo* [G] *ne bylo* 'there was no one there'; but one can also say *deti* [N] *sobirali jagody* 'the children were gathering berries', *nikto* [N] *ne pel* 'no one was singing' – but never *detej sobiralo jagody*, *nikogo ne pelo*. The syntactic use of the N, which makes this meaning overt, is naturally perceived as unmarked, in contrast to the use which suspends the meaning difference between the N and the A. This is why such active constructions as *pisateli pišut knigi* 'writers write books'; *Puškin napisal Poltavu* 'Puškin wrote Poltava' are unmarked, in comparison with such constructions as *knigi pišutsja pisateljami* 'books are written by writers'; *Poltava napisana Puškinym* 'Poltava was written by Puškin'.

unlike  
in Polish !!!

deutsch  
nominativ

The most fitting representation of the active subject, and especially the active subject of a transitive action, is an **animate being**, and that of the object an **inanimate entity** (cf. *Atti*, 144). A switching of roles – as when an inanimate entity functions as the nominative subject and an animate being as the accusative object – correspondingly smacks of personification: *gruzovik razdavił reběnka* 'the truck killed a child', *fabrika kalečit ljudej* 'the factory cripples people', *peč' požiraet mnogo uglja* 'the furnace devours much coal'. Thomson, who investigated statistically the distribution of the two semantic categories animate/inanimate between subject and object, arrived at the following conclusion: with transitive verbs the human being is the subject  $\kappa\alpha\tau'$  ἔξοχήν, the thing is the object, and animal names occupy a middle position (XXIV, 305). An A which refers to an inanimate object may lack any formal mark distinguishing it from the N, usually without any impairment of comprehension. Compare the falling together, in most Russian nominal paradigms, of the inanimate object A with the N. And typically, we assume that in *čto delaet* 'what does', it is the object that is questioned, never the subject, in contrast to *kto delaet* 'who does'.

There are languages (for example Basque and the Northern Caucasian languages) in which the aforementioned most prominent function of the N, that is, that of the subject of a transitive action, becomes the only function of that case. In such languages, the marked-unmarked case relationship is reversed relative to Russian (and other nominative-accusative languages): in these languages the marked case does not imply that the referent is the object of an action, but, to the contrary, that the referent subjects something to an action, while the unmarked case does not have this implication. Uhlenbeck calls the first **transitivus**, the second **intransitivus** (an interesting overview of the question is found in Kacnel'son, 56 ff.). The first functions as the subject of transitive verbs, while the unmarked intransitivus, naturally, plays several syntactic roles, namely that of the object of transitive verbs and the subject of intransitive verbs. Comparison of the oppositions nominative-accusative and transitive-intransitive with the oppositions of the *genera verbi* reveals the **affinity between these nominal and verbal correlations**. The transitive-intransitive pair is correctly interpreted as an opposition of the active and neutro-passive *genus*; it would be appropriate correspondingly to treat the relationship of the N and the A as an opposition of the neutro-active and passive *genus*.

ergative

## IV

The analysis of the allegedly "so ambiguous" genitive has shown with special clarity the fruitlessness of the atomistic approach, which dismembers this case into an array of different and even mutually contradictory particular meanings. Under the "individual genitives" of Russian, for example, have been listed a G of separation, a G of "the object from which the movement expressed in the verb stem takes its departure", and a G of goal, the meaning of which "is directly opposed to that of the G of separation, since the former designates an object on or to which the action is directed" (Peškovskij, 264 ff.). Compare such antitheses as the polemic contrast between Orthodox Old Believers and new doctrine as given in a writing of the Old Believers: on the one hand, *begaj bluda* [G] 'avoid lewdness', on the other hand, *želaj bluda* [G] 'desire lewdness'. In reality, such meanings as 'direction from' or 'direction to' are introduced into the sentence by the actual meaning of the verb itself, and in expressions like *ot zari* [G] *do zari* [G] 'from (evening) twilight to (morning) twilight' by the meaning of the prepositions. The very possibility of using the G to indicate two different directions shows that the G has, in itself, no directional implication.

A comparison of the G with the N and A shows that the G always indicates **the limit of the referent's involvement in the content of the utterance**. We can thus speak of the contrast between the G, which indicates the scope of involvement of its referent, and the other cases (N, A) which do not indicate this, as a **scope correlation** [*Umfangskorrelation*]. This nominal opposition can even be compared with that of the verbal **aspect correlation**, the mark of which is the designation of the scope of the action, and we can speak of a nominal aspect correlation.

As for the opposition between the signalization vs. non-signalization of an **action** directed upon the referent, this contrast is **removed** in the case of the G, which can equally well denote either an entity undergoing an action or an independent object.

The G in itself indicates only that the scope of its referent's involvement in the content of the utterance is less than that referent's entire extension. The precise scope of the involvement of the entity is determined by either the linguistic or the extra-linguistic context. The referent of the genitive can be either (a) **partially** or (b) **negatively** represented in the sentence. In the first instance the use of the genitive signifies a definite or indefinite degree of involvement (*Genitivus partitivus*) and thus establishes a spatial or temporal boundary. In the second instance the referent remains outside the content

of the utterance, while the context either determines merely that the action stops at the referent (G of limit), or determines in addition whether the action tends toward the referent (G of goal) or rather away from it (G of separation), or whether the referent is eliminated or thrust aside (G of negation).<sup>4</sup> Let us examine the individual syntactic variants of both types of genitive.

G in nominal sentences: 1) *novostej, novostej!* approximately 'what a lot of news!'; in folk dialects *takix-to delov!* approximately 'how far things have gone!'; *kakogo dela!* approximately 'see what has become of the matter!'.<sup>5</sup> A cry of the greengrocer: *kapusty! ogurcov!* '(some) cabbage! (some) cucumbers!' 2) "*vody, vody!* [G] . . . *no ja naprasno stradal'cu vodu* [A] *podaval'*" (Puškin) 'Water, water! . . . but in vain I offered the sufferer water'; "*spokojnoj noči! vsem vam spokojnoj noči*" (Esenin) 'good night! all of you, good night!'; "*limončika by!*" (A. Belyj) 'Oh, for a little lemon!'; "*ni golosa*" (Majakovskij) 'not a voice'. In all of the examples under this rubric, the entity referred to in the genitive remains outside the content of the utterance. The **independently** used G indicates, as we see from the examples, that its referent is, to an indefinite but perceptible extent, involved (1) or to be involved (2). Which of the two possibilities is meant in a given instance is determined by the situation.

Subject genitive: 1) *ljudej* [G] *sobralos'* '(many) people gathered' — *ljudi* [N] *sobralis'* (the same, but without focusing on the crowd); "*štok* [G] *bylo*" (Lermontov) 'there were (many) jokes' — *šutki* [N] *byli* (the large number is unindicated); 2) *nužno spiček* [G] 'matches are needed' — *nužny spički* [N] (without focusing on their factual absence); *strašno smerti* [G] 'it is frightening in the face of death' — *strašna smert'* [N] 'frightening is death' (in the first instance death is the negative "main figure" in the utterance and thus remains outside its content — its positive "main figures" are those who are cringing before death, while in the second instance death is the positive and only main figure); *otveta* [G] *ne prišlo* 'there came no answer' — *otvet* [N] *ne prišël* 'the answer did not come' (in the first case the answer itself is denied as if removed from the content of the utterance, while in the second only the action is denied).

Adverbial G: 1) The partitive object genitive appears in combination (a) with verbs which directly designate a change in quantity (additive or subtractive), e.g. *uspexi pridajut emu sil* 'the results increase his strength'; *pripuskaet ognja v lampe* 'he makes the flame in the lamp larger'; *nabiraet deneg* 'he accumulates money'; *s každyd dn'em ubavljajut xleba* 'every day they give less bread'; (b) with perfective verbs, since their aspect indicates the

absolute limit of the action (see "Structure . . .", above p. 3; Buslaev, 283 f.); e.g. *poel* [pf.] *xleba* [G] – *el* [impf.] *xleb* [A] 'ate bread', *vzjal* [pf.] *deneg* [G] – *bral* [impf.] *den'gi* [A] 'took money', *nadelal* [pf.] *dolgov* [G] – *dela* [impf.] *dolgi* [A] 'incurred debts', *kupit* [pf.] *baranok* [G] – *pokupat* [impf.] *baranki* [A] 'to buy *baranki* (ring-shaped rolls)', *daj* [pf.] *mne tvoego noža* [G] 'give me your knife (for a moment)'.<sup>6</sup> The converse hypothesis of Peškovskij (266 f.), that many perfective prefixes are exclusively linked to the genitive, is wrong. As far as those actives which can be used with the partitive genitive are concerned, if there is no limiting of the referent, a construction with the A arises (*nakupiljumu* 'purchased an enormous number'; *nagovoril kuču komplimentov* 'paid a host of compliments'). The weakly governed A also corresponds to a genitive of divided or limited whole: *èto proizošlo pjatogo janvarja* 'it happened on the fifth of January', *šutoček našutili* 'jokes were told', *poezdka stoit bol'six deneg* 'the trip costs a lot of money'.

2) G of limit: "*odnoj nojoj kasajas' pola*" (Puškin) 'touching the floor with one foot', "*dostig ja vysšej vlasti*" (Puškin) 'I attained the greatest power'; G of goal: "*a on, bezumnyj, iščet buri*" (Lermontov) 'and he, the madman, seeks tumult', "*svobod xoteli vy*" (Puškin) 'you wanted freedoms'; G of separation: *izbežal vernoj gibeli* 'escaped certain ruin', *bojsja kary* 'be afraid of punishment'; G of negation: "*ne poj, krasavica, pri mne ty pesen Gruzii pečal'noj*" (Puškin) 'do not sing, beautiful maiden, in my presence the songs of sad Georgia', *ne čitaju gazet* 'I read no papers', *ne našel kvartiry* 'found no apartment'. The G in such instances denotes the absence of the referent in the situations given by the sentences, but insofar as this absence receives no emphasis and is in fact even countered by the presence of the referent in the preceding context or in the extra-linguistic situation, the genitive is displaced after actives by the A: *prosit' deneg* [G] 'to ask for money', *prosit' den'gi* [A] 'to ask for the money' (which has already been mentioned – Peškovskij's example); "*ja cel' svoju dostig*" (Lermontov) 'I have attained my goal'. The external character of the referent is not indicated here, and consequently the goal is drawn into the scope of the utterance; it is portrayed as known from the start. Thus we say *čelovek v pervye dostig poljusa* [G] 'man reached the Pole for the first time' and not . . . *poljus* [A]; *ja ne slychal ètoj sonaty* [G] 'I have not heard this sonata' – the emphasis is on the unknown-ness of the sonata on the part of the speaker; *ja ne slychal ètu sonatu* [A] – this emphasis is lacking, and the fact that I have not heard it becomes mere accident, which is unable to eliminate the sonata from the content of the utterance – the presence of the sonata takes precedence: this nuance requires the A as opposed to the G.

G with adjectives: 1) *polnyj myslej* [G] 'full of thoughts' (a variety of the partitive G; cf. *polnyj mysljami* [I], where the quantitative, partitive shading is lacking); 2) *dostojnyj priznanija* 'worthy of recognition' (a variety of the G of limit), *slašče jada* 'sweeter than poison', *ugovor dorože deneg* 'an agreement is worth more than money' (a variety of the G of separation: the higher stage suppresses the lower).

G with pronouns: *čto novogo* 'what's new' (the meaning is partitive).

Adnominal G: as already noted, the G signifies that its referent is outside the content of the utterance or is only partially represented in it. This focusing, not on the referent but on the adjoining content or a part of the referent, signals the **metonymic nature** of the G, or in the case of the partitive G, a special kind of metonymy or even its synecdochic character ("a narrow objectification", as Grimm neatly put it). This is especially clear in the adnominal G, a fact which, strangely enough, is generally overlooked in the literature, causing an artificial rift between the adverbial and adnominal uses of the genitive (see e.g. Delbrück, 307 f.). Either the noun upon which the G depends limits the scope of the object in the genitive directly (*stakan vody* 'a glass of water', *časť doma* 'a part of the house'), or it abstracts from this referent something from among its properties (*krasota devuški* 'the beauty of the girl'), its utterances (*slovo čeloveka* 'the man's word'), its oppressive circumstances (*razgrom armii* 'the destruction of the army'), its relationship (*imuščestvo remeslennika* 'the property of the craftsman'), its surroundings (*sosed kuzneca* 'the neighbor of the blacksmith'), or conversely it is itself abstracted from a property or an utterance of the agent or patient (*deva krasoty* 'a maiden of beauty', *čelovek slova* 'a man of his word', *žertvy razgroma* 'victims of the rout').

The adnominal use displays most fully and clearly the semantic peculiarity of the G, and it is noteworthy that it is the only case which can refer to a pure noun – i.e. one which is free from a verbal nuance of meaning. We can regard the **adnominal use of the G** as the typical expression of this case.

To this pure adnominal use of the G is opposed its **adverbial use, as the point of maximal case contrast**. With active verbs, only the G is directly opposed to the A, since the strongly governed A always presupposes an active verb. Verbs which indicate a separation of the agent from the referent of the genitive (*izbegat* 'to avoid', *trusit* 'to be afraid', etc.), cannot – at least in the written language – be used with the A, because the entity which causes the separation counts as an active factor and not as an object of the action. The verb *lišat* 'to rob' opposes the patient, who is robbed, to that of which the latter is robbed, or in other words, to that which is excluded from the

content of the utterance. The patient functions naturally as accusative object, the other as genitive object; the presence of both is crucial and the positioning of the first object before the second necessarily differentiates between them, so that here again the case opposition is not a prerequisite; cf. *lišil otca* [A] *syna* [G] *a mat'* [A] *dočeri* [G] 'robbed the father of a son and the mother of a daughter'. As Peškovskij correctly noted (265 f.), the genitives of negation and of goal (and also of limit) tend toward confusion with the A, and the distinction is often obscured. The opposition with the greatest differentiating power is that between the partitive G and the A (*vypil vina* [G] 'drank up some wine' – *vypil vino* [A] 'drank up the wine'). Animate beings can function as partitive G sg. only in exceptional cases (e.g. *otvedal kuricy* 'tasted the chicken'), and for this reason the A vs. G opposition is of little importance in connection with nouns denoting animate beings, and is obliterated in most paradigms: in names of animate beings, the A receives the G form. The generalization of this syncretism to plurals leads to the loss of a meaning distinction: the expressions *kupil kartiny* [A] 'bought pictures' and *kupil kartin* [G] 'bought (a number of) pictures' correspond, in the case where the object is an animate being, to the single expression *kupil lošadej* [A-G] 'bought horses'.<sup>7</sup>

Although the falling together of the A with the G indicates that the referent is animate, the falling together of the A with the N, though for the most part limited to the designation of inanimate things, is nevertheless not unambiguous with respect to inanimacy (cf. *mat'* [N-A] 'mother', *myš'* [N-A] 'mouse'). In the Russian declensional system it is always the case that if there is some marker of animacy or inanimacy, the opposite feature is not unambiguously indicated by the contrasting marker. In the N the endings of the so-called neuter indicate inanimacy (the only exceptions, *suščestvo* 'living creature' and *životnoe* 'animal', indicate animacy directly by the meaning of the stem), while the other nominative endings occur in reference to animate and inanimate entities; the presence of two genitive or two locative forms indicates inanimacy, but the absence of this split indicates nothing (see Section VII). It is the same in regard to gender in nouns: most of the cases have an ending indicating masculine gender (e.g. G sg. -a, D -u, I -om, N pl. -a, G -ov), while the other endings of this case do not indicate feminine gender (e.g. G sg. -i, D -e or -i, I -uju, N pl. -i, G -ej or zero ending). Nouns are clearly differentiated in gender by the singular adjective. The two genders themselves relate to each other as a marked category indicating that the referent cannot be a man (fem.), contrasting with an unmarked category that does not indicate whether a man or a woman is being referred to (so-call-

ed masc.); cf. *tovarišč* [masc.] *Ivanova* [fem.], *zubnoj vrač* [masc.] 'Comrade Ivanova, dentist'.

The prepositional G does not differ, in the nature of its meaning, from other uses of the genitive. Here again, by eliminating all or part of the referent, it limits the participation of the referent in the utterance, or more succinctly, specifies its scope-relationships, e.g. 1) *nekotorye iz nas* 'a few of us' (partitive G); 2) *u, okolo, vozle reki* 'beside the river' (G of limit); *do reki* 'as far as the river', *dlja slavy* 'for glory' (G of goal); *iz ruž'ja* 'out of the shotgun', *ot reki* 'from the river' (G of separation); *bez zobot* 'without worries', *krome zimy* 'except for winter' (G of negation).<sup>8</sup>

## V

Neither the **Instrumental** nor the **Dative** indicate scope-relationships. These cases stand in a correlative relationship not with the G, but with the N and A. Like the A, the D also indicates that its referent is involved in an action, whereas the I, like the N, says nothing about this, and nothing about whether its referent itself exerts an action or participates in an action. Cf. *strana upravljajetsja ministrami* [I] 'the country is governed by ministers' – *ministry upravljajut stranoj* [I] 'the ministers govern the country'; *oni byli vstrečeny reběnkom* [I] 'they were met by the child' – *oni vstrečali ego reběnkom* [i] 'they had met him as a child'. Like the A, the D functions as the marked member of the directional correlations (A and D being **directional cases** in opposition to the unmarked N and I). The presence of directedness toward an object is also indicated in the prepositional use of these A and D, e.g. *v, na, za, pod, čerez, skvoz', po pojas* 'in, on, behind, under, over, through, up to the belt'; *k, navstreču, po potoku* 'towards, against, along the stream'. The directional meaning is also maintained when these prepositions are used with a noun instead of a verb: *vxod v dom* 'entry into the house', *doroga v Rim* 'road to Rome', *ključ k dveri* 'key to the door'. As mentioned above, when the general meaning of the N in contrast to that of the A does not show whether the referent is affected by an action or not, then the specific meaning of the N indicates that the utterance says nothing of such an activity, and the nature of the N is especially clear when its referent is presented as the agent in an action. This holds also for the I–D opposition, and it is the **principal meaning** of the I that Šaxmatov has in mind when he sees as the essential difference between the I and the D the fact that the former "designates a concept which is independent of the verb and is not subject to

the effects of the marked feature of the verb, but, to the contrary, designates a concept which aids in the unfolding of the marked feature and changes or determines its expression" (§444).

What then is the difference between the I and D, on the one hand, and the N and A on the other? Paraphrasing two terms of Pongs (245), I will call the I and D peripheral cases and the N and A full cases, and for the opposition between the two types I will use the designation **status - correlation** [*Stellungskorrelation*] in what follows. A **peripheral case** indicates that its referent occupies a **peripheral status** in the overall semantic content of the utterance, while a **full case** indicates nothing about such a status. A periphery presupposes a center; a peripheral case presupposes the **presence of a central point in the content of the utterance**, which the peripheral case helps determine. However, this central point need not necessarily be expressed linguistically. E.g. the novel titles *Ognem* [I] *i mečom* [I] 'With Fire and Sword', *I zolotom* [I] *i molotom* [I] 'With Gold and Hammer' presuppose an action with respect to which the referents in the instrumental case act as implements; the heading *Ivanu Ivanoviču Ivanovu* [D] presupposes something intended for the person referred to in the dative, and although this something is not expressed, it serves as the central point of the utterance, with the addressee as the peripheral point.

I would like to emphasize that what is specific to the peripheral cases is not that they indicate the presence of two points in the utterance, but only that they render one peripheral with respect to the other. The A, too, indicates the presence of two points, one hierarchically lower than the other, but the A does not specify that this subordinate point is a marginal one in the utterance, one which could be omitted without impairment to the central one, as is the effect of the peripheral cases. The verb *delaet* 'does' requires answers to the questions *kto* 'who' and *čto* 'what', and *ne delaet* 'does not' requires answers to the questions *kto* and *čego* [G]. The absence of the N and A (or G in the negative) lends the utterance an elliptical character. Indeed the questions *čem* [I] *delaet*, *komu* [D] *delaet* do not emerge from the nature of the utterance itself, and are not directly linked to its center. They are, so to speak, incidental questions. Cf. also *delo delaetsja, sdelano* 'the work is being done, has been done'. Questioning of the agent (*kem* [I]) is optional; *on dal vsě, čto mog dat* 'he gave all that he could give'; *každyj den' on posylaet pis'ma* 'every day he sends letters' – the lack of the D is not felt as a lacuna.

In expressions like *tečenie* [N] *otneslo lodku* 'the current carried off the boat'; *olenja ranila strela* [N] 'an arrow wounded the deer'; *paxnet seno* [N]

'the hay smells', on the one hand, and *tečeniem* [I] *otneslo lodku*; *olenja ranilo streloj* [I]; *paxnet senom* [I], on the other, the referent is the same, but the semantic content is different; in both instances the carrier of the action is identical, except that in the hierarchy of meanings, it is represented in the first instance as the subject, and in the second as an adjunct of the predicate. The instrumental form assigns a secondary status to its referent, but the combination of a verb with the I does not in itself state whether the secondary status is due to the speaker's attitude, or whether the I plays, in actual fact, only a secondary role.<sup>9</sup> Cf. *risunok nabrosan perom* [I] 'the drawing has been done with a pen' – *risunok nabrosan xudožnikom* [I] 'the drawing has been done by an artist': in the first instance the I denotes a mere implement, namely a tool, but in the second it denotes the author of the work, who with respect to the work itself is moved to the periphery of the utterance and is treated, so to speak, as a necessary presupposition. In active constructions it is sufficient to place the I next to a N, and the referent of the I receives an objective auxiliary character. The peripheral status of the referent is here expressed as a contrast between means and author: *oxotnik* [N] *ranil olenja streloj* [I] 'the hunter wounded the deer with an arrow'; *saraj* [N] *paxnet senom* [I] 'the barn smells of hay'.

Within the framework of the general meaning of the I, there are three semantic types to be differentiated.

1. The I indicates some stipulation of the action. This **I of stipulation**, which the above examples have already illustrated, gives the source of the action (*ubit vragami* 'killed by enemies'), the motive (*uvleč'sja sportom* 'to be keen on sports', *tomit'sja bezdel'em* 'to weary of idleness'), the implement (*žat' serpom* 'to reap with the sickle', *rasporjažat'sja den'gami* 'to dispose of money', *upravljat' mašinoj* 'to operate a machine', *vladet' rabami* 'to own slaves'), the mode (*idti vojnoj* 'to go to war', literally 'to go with war'), the space through which motion occurred (*idti lesom* 'to go through the woods'), the time of the action (*putešestvovat' noč'ju* 'to travel at night'). Such doublets as *švyrjat' kamniami* [I] – *švyrjat' kamni* [A] 'to throw stones' are erroneously said by Peškovskij to be "stylistic synonyms" (269). Actually, here, too, the I indicates an auxiliary or incidental role of the referent, and the A the directedness of an action toward the referent. Therefore the opposition between the medium and the goal, between the implement and the self-sufficient object, is maintained. Thus we say: *čtoby probit' stenu, oni švyrjali v neč kamniami* [I] 'in order to break through the wall, they throw stones at them', but *on bescel'no švyrjal kamni* [A] *v vodu* 'aimlessly he

threw stones into the water'. Even clearer is the opposition between the constructions *govorit' rezkimi slovami* 'to speak with sharp words' – *govorit' rezkie slova* 'to speak sharp words': in the former the speaker is referring to the content of the utterance, in the latter to the utterance itself. The tautological "I of reinforcement", in the usual terminology, is a kind of reduplication that emphasizes the intensity of the action (*krikom kričat* 'to shout with a shout'), while the tautological A eliminates, so to speak, the object of the action by naming it (*klič kličat* 'to call a call'). The I of stipulation is related to an expressed or implied verb (*knutom ego!* 'at him with the whip!') or to a noun signifying an activity (*uvlečenie sportom* 'enthusiasm for sports', *udar nožom* 'a blow with a knife', *oskorblenie dejstviem* 'an insult by action', *doroga lesom* 'a way through the woods'). The replacement of this I with a N signifies a disintegration of syntactic perspective and a dismembering of the sentence into equivalent sections: *on udaril ego šaska [N] na otmaš'* 'he struck him, swinging his sabre over his own shoulder in a downward diagonal motion', *"komsomolec – k noge noga [N]! plečo [N] k pleču! marš!"* (Majakovskij) 'komsomol member – foot to foot! Shoulder to shoulder! March!'

2. The **I of restriction** limits "the field of application of the sign" which is expressed in the predicate or in the attribute to which this case refers: *pomolodet' dušoj, jun dušoj, junyj dušoj* 'to become spiritually young, spiritually young, spiritually a youngster'; *junoša dušoj, on ne mog primirit'sja s nepravedlivost'ju* 'a youth in spirit, he could not be reconciled to injustice'. Peripheral status emerges here as confrontation of a part with the more relevant whole.

3. The **I of role** refers to the same entity as the corresponding (expressed or implied) full case in the same sentence, and signifies that a special function of that entity – a passing, occasional (acquired or negotiable) property – is involved. The I is attached to or inserted in the predicate. *On zdes' sud'ej* 'he functions here as judge', *budet sud'ej* 'will be a judge', *stal sud'ej* 'became a judge',<sup>10</sup> *on izbran sud'ej* 'he has been elected judge', *ego naznačili sud'ej* 'he was appointed judge', *my znávali ego sud'ej* 'we knew him as judge', *sud'ej on posetil nas* 'he visited us as judge', *ja ne vidal eë lica [G] takim ozabočennym [I]* 'I have never seen her face so worried'. But if a permanent, original, inalienable property of the entity is meant, or at least if there is no intention to designate the character of this property as episodic, then the I is not possible. *Vse oni byli greki [N]* 'they were all Greeks'; *mładšij syn byl*

*durak [N]* 'the younger son was a fool'. The expression *bud' tatarinom [I]* 'be a Tartar' we perceive as an appeal to Tartar nationalism, while the expression "*bud' tatarin [N]*" in Puškin's epigram means: if you are born a Tartar, your national identity will remain with you, and there is nothing you can do about it. In the humorous verse "*on byl tituljarnyj sovetnik [N], ona general'skaja doč', on robko v ljubvi ej priznalsja, ona prognala ego proč'*" 'he was a titular counsellor, she a general's daughter; he timidly told her of his love; she turned him away', the rank of titular counsellor is perceived as part of the framework within which the scene takes place; it is felt to be something permanent, and the state of affairs before and after is purposely left unsaid. But *on byl tituljarnym, potom nadvornym sovetnikom [I]* 'he was a titular, later a royal counsellor'. When the attention of the speaker is focused on a period of time and the utterance is correspondingly static, the I of role gives way to the N. E. Haertel, in her substantial survey of the predicative I and N in the language of Turgenev, remarks that "there are a large number of sentences in which the N takes the place of the expected I, e.g. those with *togda, v svoë vremja*, i.e. those involving a temporal delimitation, or other circumstance which places a given utterance in the domain of the accidental" (106). But this evidence also bears witness to a subtle and important differentiation between the two cases on the part of the great stylist. Indeed, as long as the delimitations *togda* 'then', *v svoë vremja* 'in his time' are not meant as part of an antithesis, they even require a static-appearing N: "*vy byli togda rebënok [N]*" 'you were then a child', *v svoë vremja sil'nyj byl latinist [N]* 'was in his time an accomplished Latinist'. A few more illustrative examples: *on vernulsja bol'noj [N]* 'he returned ill' (and may have been ill before) – *on vernulsja bol'nym [I]* 'he returned ill (having become ill)': *ja uvidel dom, zapuščennyj i opustelyj [N]* 'I saw a house, neglected and deserted, – *ja uvidel dom, zapuščennym i opustelym [I]*; here the neglect and disrepair are clearly contrasted with an earlier and different state of affairs. "*Eë sestra zvalas' Tat'jana [N]*" (Puškin) 'her sister was named Tatjana' – . . . *Tat'janoj [I]*: in the second instance it is the giving of a name that is expressed by the case form, but in the first, only its possession; we could say: *sestra zvalas' Tanej [I]*, *a kogda podrosła, Tat'janoj [I]* 'the sister was called Tanja, and when she was grown, Tatjana'. Cf. *sestru [A] zvali Tat'janoj [I]* 'they called the sister Tatjana' or, with disruption of the syntactic perspective: – *zvali (: ) Tat'jana [N]*. Likewise in a sentence of Herzen: *Odin Parfenon [A] nazvali (: ) cerkov' [N] sv. Magdaliny* 'A Parthenon they called the Church of St. Magdalene'. Šaxmatov incorrectly sees here a "double A" (§430).

No less clear than the peripheral status of a temporally delimited and

therefore synecdochic meaning of an entity in contrast to its wider meaning is the marginal status in the value hierarchy of the utterance occupied by the metaphorical meaning of an entity in contrast to its proper meaning in the construction with the **I of comparison**; Miklosich (735) already perceived the inner relationship of the latter to the I of role: *u nego grud' kolesom* 'his chest is like a wheel' (is muscular), *kazak bujnym sokolom rinulsja na vraga* 'the Cossack threw himself upon the enemy like an enraged hawk'. But once the figurative meaning is viewed as inseparably connected with the referent, and the comparison changes into an identification, the I is no longer valid: *kazak, bujnyj sokol* [N], *rinulsja na vraga* 'the Cossack, an enraged hawk, threw himself upon the enemy'.

**Tautological constructions** also clearly reveal the semantic peculiarities of the I of role and the I of comparison (the difference between the two is removed here). Comparison of such constructions as *sidnem sidel* 'sat as (like) a sitter' (stay-at-home) or *dožd' lil livnem* 'the rain poured as (like) a downpour' (in torrents) with *krikom kričat* and the like shows that in both cases the I reinforces the predicate in that it releases its content, but in the latter instance this released content is portrayed as a mode of the predicate, and in the former as a property of the subject closely linked to the predicate (the so-called auxiliary predicate). In such expressions as *on ostalsja durak durakom* 'he remained a fool like (as) a fool' (a total fool), "*rož' les lesom*" (Šaxmatov, *Sint.*, § 2122) 'the rye is a forest like a forest' (is a real forest), the tautological combination of N and I enhances the given property by presenting it as substance (N) and as accident (I), or as identification (N) and as simile (I) at the same time. Peškovskij (244) is unable to explain on the basis of the meaning of the instrumental the tautological constructions in such adversative sentences as *razgovory* [N] *razgovorami* [I], *no pora i za delo* 'talks are talks, but it's time to get to work'. Yet it is precisely in this productive construction that the general meaning of the I is revealed: the object named by the N is shoved to one side, so to speak, by means of the I, and is assigned only peripheral status in the content of the utterance. In the proverb "*družba* [N] *družboj* [I], *a služba* [N] *služboj* [I]" 'friendship is friendship, but duty is duty', both entities displace each other to the periphery.

As we have seen from the usage discussed above, the I itself denotes nothing more than **peripheral status**; it occupies the same position among the peripheral cases that the N does among the full cases: that of the unmarked category. Correspondingly the I, like the N, tends toward the role of pure

"lexical form". Insofar as this tendency is realized, the peripherally marked I becomes an **adverb**. See the numerous examples of *instrumentalia tantum* amounting to adverbs in Šaxmatov (478): *opromet'ju* 'hurriedly' *ukradkoj* 'stealthily', *tajkom* 'secretly', *dybom* '(standing) on end', *blagin matom* 'at the top of one's voice', etc.

Everything other than peripheral status is given in individual uses of the I by the actual meaning of its referent and by the context, but not by the case form. Only by the actual meanings of the instrumentals in Majakovskij's lines "*morem bukv, čisl plavaj ryboj v vode*" 'through the sea of letters and numbers, swim like a fish in water' do we know that *morem* is an I of stipulation (namely of the path of the action) and *ryboj* an I of comparison. The connection of this peripheral case to the core of the utterance is such a loose one that without the real and formal meanings of the surrounding words we could not know to what and in what way the I *žandarmom* in the following sentence refers: *ona znavala ego žandarmom* 'she knew him as a gendarme', *on znaval ež žandarmon* 'he, as a gendarme, knew her', *on naletel žandarmom na detvoru* 'he rushed like a gendarme upon the children', *on prigrozil žandarmom brodjage* 'he threatened the vagabond with calling a gendarme', *on byl naznačen žandarmom* 'he was appointed a gendarme', *on byl ubit žandarmom* 'he was killed by a gendarme'. Typical examples are given by Potebnja (506): on the one hand *ona pletët kosy vtroe, devkoju* 'she braids her hair in triple braids, like a young girl', on the other hand *ženščina devkoju inače pletët kosy čem ženkoju* 'women braid their hair differently as young girls and as grown women' or *devkoju* [I] *krasuetsja kosoju* [I], *a baboju* [I] *ne svetit volosom* [I] 'as a girl she makes a show of her braids, but as a woman she doesn't display her hair'.

This loose type of connection is expressly clear also in the prepositional use of the I. Here we have what Hjelmslev (129) calls the *relation sans contact*, where the prepositional I shows no contact with its referent (*s, nad, pod, pered, za, meždu šarami* 'with, over, under, in front of, behind, between the spheres').

The **general meaning of the D** is very clear; it signifies peripheral status, like the I, and involvement in an action, like the A. Thus the Dative has been defined as the case of the indirect object or the auxiliary object. According to Šaxmatov "the adverbial D expresses a concept which is dependent upon the verb and to which the action of the verb is directed without actually embracing this concept and without affecting it directly" (§ 435). According to Peškovskij the Dative specifies only the addressee, signifying the mere directedness of the action without affecting the object (267 f.).

Compared with the accusative object, the more intimate connection between the dative object and the action is especially clear in that the D denotes the **existence of its referent as independent of the action**, while the A is silent in this regard and can refer equally well to an inner or outer object. Skalička writes in his book (which contains much of interest for general grammar): "one cannot assume a fundamental difference, for example, between the relationships of verb to noun in cases like Czech *učiti se něčemu* 'to learn something' and *studovati něco* 'to study something'. Here we sense a certain meaninglessness of the dative and accusative. And when one interchangeably uses *učiti se něčemu* or *učiti se něco*, the difference is perhaps felt only as a stylistic one: the construction with the dative is more pedantic, 'better', than that with the accusative. A certain meaninglessness of the dative or accusative is clear in this case" (21). Such an obliteration of meanings is characteristic of Czech, with its nearly eroded system of case oppositions; but in Russian, with its more stable case system, the corresponding pair *učit'sja* 'to learn' with D and *učit'* 'to learn' with A is clearly differentiated as to meaning. One can say *ja učus' francuzskomu jazyku* [D] 'I am learning the French language', since the French language exists independently of my learning it, but it is impossible to say *ja učus' svoemu uroku* [D]; one can say only *ja uču svoj urok* [A] 'I am learning my lesson', since my lesson has no existence without relation to my learning it. Also in such a prepositional D as *ěto vedět ego k gibeli* [D] 'this is leading him to ruin' instead of *vyzvaet ego gibel'* [A] 'brings about his ruin', the dative object is felt as an easy metaphor, similar to the same word in *ego ždět gibel'* 'ruin awaits him': the ruin is portrayed here as something certain, previously known and ideally existent.

Usually a given verb itself determines whether its object is to be taken as semantically direct or indirect, and if there are two objects, the verb usually determines which is to have a peripheral status and which is to be taken as directly affected by the action. In the sentence *ja prepodaju rebjatom* [D] *istoriju* [A] 'I am teaching history to the children', history functions as direct object, and the children as recipients; conversely in the sentence *ja uču rebjat* [A] *istorii* [D] 'I am teaching the children history' the children count as the direct object of my activity, while history is a mere accompaniment of the activity. Occasionally the direct and indirect objects are reversible, so that the opposition of the D and A is semantically transparent: *poët upodobil devušku* [A] *roze* [D] 'the poet compared the girl to the rose' — . . . *rozu* [A] *devuške* [D] ' . . . the rose to the girl'; *on predpočitaet brata* [A] *sestre* [D] 'he prefers his brother to his sister' — . . . *sestru* [A] *bratu* [D] ' . . . his sister to his brother': the action (that of preferring) is upon the accusative

object, but the dative object is affected by the action, since the latter takes place with reference to the former. In a few instances a verb is used with an A as well as a D to designate one and the same predication: of this type are the doublets *(po)darit' kogo* [A] *čem* I 'present someone [A] with something [I]' — *(po)darit' komu* [D] *čto* [A] 'give someone [D] something [A]'; in the first instance the receiver of the gift is the direct object of the action, and in the second, the gift: the receiver becomes a mere addressee, while the gift is transformed from a mere instrument into an actual object. A song fragment, cited by Greč, neatly illustrates this opposition: "*ne dari menja ty zlatom, podari liš' mne sebja*" (155) 'bestow on me no gold, give me only yourself'. Here the gold is depreciated and the gift is brought into prominence in opposition to it.

"The D of direct reflexive reference" (see Nilov 143) is characterized by the fact that the actual **agent is perceived as a recipient**: an action, or more exactly a state of affairs, is experienced as independent of the activity of the experiencer (cf. *bol'nomu* [D] *polegčalo* 'things became easier for the sick man' — *bol'noj počuvstvoval sebja lučše* 'the sick man felt better'; *mne* [D] *ne spitsja* 'I can't sleep' — *ja ne splju* 'I do not sleep', *ja ne mogu spat* 'I can't sleep'; *čego mne* [D] *xočetsja* — *čego ja xoču* 'what do I want'); or an action, expressed in the infinitive, is portrayed as predetermined or prescribed from the start, and the dative object correspondingly functions as the recipient of a command, prohibition, or warning of destiny (a proverb: "*byt' byčku* [D] *na verěvočke*" 'the bull-calf one day will be haltered'; from a folk tale: "*nosit' vam* [D], *ne perenosit'*" 'you must endure, never endure enough'; Lermontov: "*ne vidat' tebe* [D] *Tamary, kak ne vidat' svoix ušej*" 'you may no more see Tamara than you may see your own ears'); the stroke of destiny can be portrayed as a wish or apprehension of the speaker: *vernut'sja by emu* [D] *zdorovym* 'may he return healthy', *deneg by nam* [D] *pobol'še* (here the action is left unexpressed) 'if only we could get some more money'; *ne popast' by emu* [D] *v zapadnju* 'may he not fall into the trap'.

The so-called **ethical dative** explicitly assigns the content of the utterance to its recipient — the hearer is perceived as if he were affected by the action, as if it had even taken place with reference to him: *prišel on tebe* [D] *domoj, vse dveri nastež'* 'he came home, all doors wide open'; *tut vam takoj kavardak načalsja* 'here began such confusion'.

Like the I, the D in non-prepositional use can define only those words that encompass the meaning of the event. These cases therefore can only define a noun 1) when it is an action word (*otvet kritiku* 'answer to a critic', *podarok synu* 'gift for the son', *ugroza miru* 'threat to peace', *torgovlja lesom* [I]

'trade in wood', among others – see above); 2) when it is used as a predicate necessarily having the meaning of performing a function (*rusškaja pesnja - vsem pesnjam* [D] *pesnja* 'a Russian song is a song that surpasses all songs', literally: is a song to all songs, *ja vsem vam* [D] *otec* 'I am a father to you all', *on nam* [D] *ne sud'ja* 'he is no judge for us', *on rostom* [I] *bogatyř* 'he is a giant in size'); 3) rarely, as an apposition latently containing the meaning of occurring (being, lasting, functioning) (*rusškaja pesnja, vsem pesnjam* [D] *pesnja, neslas' nad rekoj* 'a Russian song – a song surpassing all songs – floated over the river', *mat' dvux devic, vnuček Mixailu Makaroviču* [D])<sup>11</sup> 'the mother of two girls, granddaughters of Mixail Makarovič' (kinship is treated in Russian as performing a kind of a function; cf. *obe prixodjatsja emu* [D] *vnučkami* [I] 'both are granddaughters of his'); *oxotnik, rostom* [I] *bogatyř*, *vyšel na medvedja* 'the hunter, a giant in size, took off after the bear'); and finally 4) when it functions as a one-member nominal sentence, a predicate, so to speak, of the extra-linguistic situation: *vsem pesnjam pesnja* '(that is) a song that surpasses all songs', *kuma mne* '(that is) my godmother', the same fully expressed in words – *éta ženščina prixoditsja mne kumoj* 'this woman is my godmother'; *bogatyř rostom* '(that is) someone (who is) a giant in size', "Čaplin požarnym" 'Chaplin as a fireman'. But neither the D nor the I can in such instances define a subject or an object. For example, one cannot say *vsem pesnjam pesnja neslas' nad rekoj* or – *prodolžает vosxiščat' nas* '– continues to delight us' (nor *bogatyř rostom pošel na medvedja, vstretil bogatyřja* [A] *rostom* 'met a –'), but we say, e.g. *pesn' pesnej* [G] *prodolžает vosxiščat' nas* 'the Song of Songs continues to delight us'. – The genitive in this case denotes the entirety (the entirety of songs) from which this song is selected.

The dative meaning of "more remote object" occurs with the preposition *k*. Cf. such oppositions as *k lesu* 'toward the forest' – *v les* 'into the forest' with what has been said above about the prepositional use of the instrumental. Similarly *strel'ba po utkam* [D] 'the shooting at ducks' says less about hitting the ducks than *strel'ba v utok* [A]. One can say *oplakivat' pokojnika* [A] 'to mourn for the deceased' and *oplakivat' poterju* [A] 'to mourn the loss' or *plakat' po pokojniku* [D] 'to weep after the deceased', but never *plakat' po potere* [D].<sup>12</sup> Combinations of the polysemous preposition *po* with the D give various shadings of "auxiliary object". Noteworthy is the opposition between the accusative object, upon which the action is directed, and the dative object, which it only lightly touches: *xlopnul ego prjamo v lob* 'slapped him right in the forehead' – *xlopnul ego družeski po pleču* 'he clapped him amiably on the shoulder'; *vyxožu na pole* 'I am going to the field' – *idu*

*po polju* 'I am going over the field'. The latter sentence is opposed, on the other hand, to one like *idu polem* 'I am going by way of the field', where the I is not an object of the action, but almost an aid or medium of the going, one stage on the way to something else. Cf. *idu polem v derevnju* 'I am going by way of the field to the village' or *idu polem, potom lesom i lugom* 'I am going by way of the field, then by way of the forest and the meadow'. One cannot say *vozduxom* [I] *letit ptica*, but only *po vozduxu* [D] – 'in the air flies a bird', since the bird does not fly without the air. *Pogorel'cy postroili novyj posëlok* [A], *každyj po izbe* [D] 'those who had been burnt out built a new settlement, with a cottage for each'. The relationship of the peripheral object to the full object is expressed here as part to the whole which is the main concern. *Ja uznal ego* [A] *po neuključej poxodke* [D] 'I recognized him by his clumsy gait' – two objects of my action must be distinguished here: I noticed the clumsy gait and thus recognized the man, which was the most important concern. *Ja po rassejannosti* [D] *zaper dver'* [A] 'I absentmindedly shut the door' – here again, I divide my action into two expressions: I was absentminded, and as a result – here we come to the nucleus of the sentence – I closed the door. It can even happen that the two actions are different: *po ego prikazaniju* [D] *ja pokinul komnatu* [A] 'at his command I left the room'. To the above-mentioned opposition between *učus' francuzskomu jazyku* – *uču urok* corresponds the difference between *otmetka po francuzskomu jazyku* [D] 'a grade in French' – *otmetka za urok* [A] 'a grade for the lesson'.

From our discussion of the N and A it is clear that the two cases are maximally in contrast when they function as subject and object of a transitive action; the most appropriate vehicle of the first function is an animate being and that of the second an inanimate entity. The I is most sharply opposed to the other cases when it has the meaning of an instrument or tool. A tool is notably different, on the one hand, from the objects of the action, and on the other hand, from the subject of the action. The remaining varieties of I can all, with relative ease, be transposed into other cases (e.g. *medved' ubit oxotnikom* [I] 'the bear was killed by the hunter' → *oxotnik* [N] *ubil medvedja* 'the hunter killed the bear'; *sosedi šli drug na druga vojnoj* [I] 'the neighbors fought against each other in a war' → *veli drug s drugom vojnu* [A] '– made war on one another'; *služil soldatom* [I] 'served as a soldier' → *služil v soldatax* [L pl.]; *letit sokolom* [I] → *letit kak sokol* [N] 'flies like a hawk'); the I of instrument, in contrast, can be replaced by another case only by an acutely felt metonymy which forces the instigator of the action from his role: *ja pišu pis'mo perom* [I] 'I write the letter with a pen' → *moë pero*

[N] *pišet pis'mo* 'my pen writes the letter'. The I of instrument, with transitive verbs, usually denotes an inanimate entity.

Of all the uses of the D, the D of address with transitive verbs is most clearly opposed to the other cases, and its meaning, with few exceptions, cannot be expressed by other cases (*dat' knigu bratu* 'to give the book to the brother', *pišat' pis'mo drugu* 'to write a letter to the friend', *govorit' derzosti sosedu* 'to say insolent things to the neighbor'); cf. *vernul otca* [A] *synu* [D] 'gave the father back to the son' or *synu* [D] *otca* [A] and *otcu* [D] *syna* [A] 'the son to the father' or *syna* [A] *otcu* [D]. The other uses of the D, however, can be replaced by other cases without drastic changes in meaning (e.g. *ja udivilsja tvoemu pis'mu* [D] → *ja byl udivlen tvoim pis'mom* [I] 'I was surprised by your letter'; *predpočitaju rozu rezede* [D] 'I prefer the rose to the mignonette' → *okazyvaju predpočtenie roze pered rezedoj* [I] 'I give the rose preference over the mignonette'; *ja radujus' tvoej radosti* [D] 'I am happy at (i.e. because of) your happiness' → *ja radujus' tvoej radost'ju* [I] 'I am happy at (i.e. share in) your happiness' and so forth). The D of address usually is carried by an animate being (cf. Delbrück, 185; *Atti*, 144), and the A of address by an inanimate entity, especially the A of inner object, and it is just this A that is most sharply opposed to the D, since the latter can express only an outer object (there are occasional exceptional animate beings as A of inner object: *Bog sozdal človeka* 'God created man'; *ona začala, rodila mladenca* 'she conceived and bore a child').<sup>13</sup> Thus, when we consider the system of case oppositions in its essence, we find a tendency to distribute animate and inanimate contrastively between the full cases, on the one hand, and the peripheral cases, on the other:

N animate	A inanimate
I inanimate	D animate

Indicative of the anchoring of this distribution in linguistic perception is the revealing system of "school-grammar questions": *kto* [N] *delaet, čto* [A] *delaet, čem* [I] *delaet, komu* [D] *delaet* 'who is doing, is doing what, is doing with what, is doing to whom'.

## VI

In the locative, as in the G and in opposition to the D and A, the opposition of directedness is irrelevant. Like the G, the L can denote an object affected by

the action (cf. *priznajus' v ošibke* [L] 'I confess to the error'; *priznaju ošibku* [A] 'I acknowledge the error'; *sužu o sobytijax* [L] 'I judge of the incidents' – *obsuždaju sobytija* [A] 'I judge the incidents'); but it can also denote an object of which nothing is said regarding its being affected by an action (cf. *ploščad' Majakovskogo v Moskve* [L] 'Majakovskij Square in Moscow' – *ploščad' Majakovskogo, Moskva* [N] 'Majakovskij Square, Moscow'; *čudovišče o trěx golovax* [L] 'the three-headed monster' – *čudovišče s tremja golovami* [I] 'the monster with three heads').

I say or write *luna* 'the moon' and mean thereby only a single object; but if I say or write *o lune* [L] 'about the moon', the hearer/reader is at once made aware that two objects are involved, the moon and a predication about it, and most directly this predication; the moon is only indirectly referred to as part of the expression's peripheral content. It is the same when we hear or read – *na lune* [L] 'on the moon': two objects are meant, the moon and something which is or takes place on the moon; the latter constitutes, so to speak, the core of the utterance, and the moon *per se* is again regarded as peripheral to this.

One might ask whether this difference is linked to the opposition between prepositional and non-prepositional use of case, rather than to a difference in case itself.<sup>14</sup> It is true that the Russian preposition indicates a connection between two entities, and denotes, in particular, the indirect – or as in Greč's old definition – the "weakest, most distant relations" between the two members. But the prepositional construction for the L, in contrast to the A, G, I, and D, is not one of several syntactic possibilities, but one single and necessary possibility, similar to the non-prepositional construction for the N or that with the (expressed or implicit) verb for the A. The meaning of the prepositional use does not function as one of the special meanings of the L, but as its general meaning. In addition, the L unambiguously emphasizes the dominant category in the hierarchy of meaning of the sentence, and this does not occur in the prepositional use of the full cases (A, G). (As for the I and D, they indicate peripheral status in contrast to the dominant category in the hierarchy independently of whether or not they are used with a preposition.) The L indicates its own peripheral status in contrast to the explicit or implicit dominant point, while at the same time it denotes the "more limited objectivization" of the entity which is in the locative and the complete "objectivization" of the entity signified by the dominant category in the hierarchy and limited by the entity which is in the locative. The entity which is in the locative is not represented in the utterance to its full extent; thus the L is, like the G, a scope case. It differs, of course, from the G in that

it also defines the extension and in fact **the full extension of the object which is the dominant category in the hierarchy** and thus operates as a **peripheral case**.

*Rasskazy o vojne* [L] 'stories about the war, of the war, from the war', *rasskazyvajut o vojne* 'they tell about the war, of the war': the background of the story is indicated; the war, on the other hand, is treated as a mere partitive in the utterance. *Ostrov na reke* 'the island on the river': the extension of the island is defined, but not the extension of the river. *Poduška ležit na divane* 'the cushion lies on the sofa': the entire cushion, but only the surface of the sofa, is involved. *Bumagi zaperty v jaščike* [L] 'the papers are locked in the drawer' – *bumagi zaperty v jaščik* [A] 'the papers were locked in the drawer': they were not there before; thus the object is in this case not fully delimited temporally. *Grešnik raskajalsja v svoej žizni* [L] 'the sinner repented of his life': the life of the sinner exhausts the repentance, but not the reverse.

The preposition *pri* with the L designates a temporal limitation (*pri Petre* 'in Peter's time'), the zone of relation, influence, or observation **within which** something takes place: *služil pri dvore* 'served in court', *on pri fabrike* 'he is with the factory', *pri gorode sloboda* 'the city had a suburb', *skazal pri žene* 'said in the presence (within hearing) of his wife'.

The "feature-enumerating" L with the preposition *o* (cf. Nilov, 193, 195) imparts a quantitative limitation to the object in the locative; the enumerated feature in its entirety is characteristic, and exhaustively comprehends its nature: *stol o trěx nožkax* 'the three-legged table', *ruka o šesti pal'cax* 'the six-fingered hand', especially *stol s tremja treščinami* [I] 'the table with three scratches', *dom s dvumja trubami* 'the house with two chimneys'.

The L is thus marked as a scope case as opposed to the N, I, A, and D, and as a peripheral case as opposed to the N, A, and G. It is, so to speak, the antipode of the absolutely unmarked N: the case which is **always prepositional** and the case which is **never prepositional** are **diametrically opposed** to each other. It is noteworthy that the Russian grammatical tradition has always (as in Meletij Smotrickij in the 17th century) started its declensional paradigm with the N, and ended with the L. The customary contrasting of the N, A, and G (our full cases) with the others (our peripheral cases) was fundamentally correct, except for the untenable basis for this classification (cf. Wundt, II, 62, 74 f.).

## VII

In the declension of many names of inanimate entities the G and L are split into two separate cases: some masc. sg. nouns with a zero ending in the N distinguish **two genitives** – a G I, ending in stressed or unstressed *-a*, and a G II, ending in a stressed or unstressed *-u*. A number of these, as well as a number of other nouns in the same declension, distinguish **two locatives** – the L I, ending in *-e* or its unstressed variant, and the L II, ending in stressed *-u*. Moreover, some fem. sg. nouns with a zero ending in the N distinguish between the L I, ending in unstressed *-i*, and the L II, ending in stressed *-i*.

Attempts have often been made to define the functions of the two subclasses of G and L, but these definitions usually embrace only a part of the sphere of meaning of each. Thus Bogorodickij (115) opposes to the G a special "case of departure" (e.g. *iz lesu* 'out of the woods'), and "in the sphere of the so-called prepositional" he distinguishes a "locative" (*na domu* 'at home') and an "explicative" case (*o dome* 'about the house'); yet it remains unclear why the "case of departure" disappears in the construction *iz těmnogo lesa* 'out of the dark woods', while the nuance of departure remains in the constructions *čaška čaju* 'a cup of tea', *prošu čaju* 'I ask for tea'; and why the "explicative" case appears in constructions like *pri dome* 'at the house', *v vašem dome* 'in your house' instead of the "locative". Nor does Durnovo provide an exact boundary between the two subtypes of G and L, in remarking that the genitive in *-u* is most frequent in words designating a quantity, and in distinguishing a locative (*na vozú* 'on the cart', *na mel'f* 'on the sand-bank') from the prepositional, the locative being used "after *v* and *na* with a pure locative and temporal meaning" (247 ff.).

Greater attention to the question of the double genitive with "names of substances" was given by Thomson (XXVIII, 108 ff.): "if the mass appears to be spatially restricted and ordinarily has a definite shape of its own, we treat these features as accidental, since, from a subjective standpoint, they are non-essential . . . In many masculine names of substances the genitive ending *-u* is used in place of the *-a* when they denote pure substances". In this connection Thomson compares such constructions as *kupi syru* [G II] 'buy cheese' – *vmesto syra* [G I] 'instead of cheese', *butylka mědu* [G II] 'a bottle of mead' – *prigotovlenie měda* [G I] 'the preparation of mead', *on kupil lesu* [G II] 'he bought woods' – *granica lesa* [G I] 'the edge of the woods'. The most insightful definition of the boundary between the forms in question is provided by Šaxmatov (*Očerck*, 100 ff., 122 f.). He establishes that genitives in *-u* are formed with noncount words with a meaning of substance, collectivity,

or abstraction, and that the *-a* ending connotes "the individualization or concretization of the substance-concept"; he adduces lists of words having a stressed *-u* or *-i* in the L after the prepositions *v* and *na*, these endings being generally avoided when the noun is accompanied by an attribute and its meaning thereby individualized; the same thing is found in the genitive used with abstract nouns.<sup>15</sup>

What, then, is the general meaning of the apparently parallel oppositions G I - G II and L I - L II? The nouns in the G II (or L II) necessarily occur also with the G I (or L I). The G II and the L II are **marked** categories in relation to the G I and L I. They indicate, in opposition to the unmarked G I and L I, that their referents function in the content of the utterance not as shapes, but as something **shaping or being shaped**. Correspondingly, the G II and L II can be regarded as **cases of shaping**, and their relation to the G I and L I as the **shaping correlation** [*Gestaltungskorrelation*].

**Mass nouns**, or the closely related **abstract nouns**,<sup>16</sup> of which a definite portion (*ložka percu* 'a spoonful of pepper', *funt goroxu* 'a pound of peas', *mного смеху* 'much laughter'), an indefinite portion (*čaj!* '(some) tea!', *smexu bylo* 'there was laughter'), or a zero portion (*net čaju* 'there is no tea', *bez percu* 'without pepper', *bez smexu* 'without laughter') is involved in the utterance, are represented as positive or negative only through the **limiting function of the utterance**.

In those instances where the mass noun or abstract noun is treated not as a substance but as a concrete entity which is defined, valued, or perceptually treated as such, the G II loses its justification, given the nature of the G II which disregards the signified object's concreteness. Thus we obtain oppositions like the following: *rjumka kon'jaku* [G II] 'a glass of cognac', *skol'ko kon'jaku* 'how much cognac', *napilsja kon'jaku* 'got drunk on cognac', *ne ostalos' kon'jaku* 'there was no cognac left', *bez kon'jaku* 'without cognac' - *zapax kon'jaka* [G I] 'the smell of cognac', *kačestvo kon'jaka* 'the quality of cognac', *krepče kon'jaka* 'stronger than cognac', *razgovor kosnulsja kon'jaka* 'the conversation touched on cognac', *opasajus' kon'jaka* 'I am afraid of cognac', *ne ljublju kon'jaka* 'I don't like cognac', *ot kon'jaka* 'from cognac'. Admittedly there are instances where the border between the two case forms appears to fluctuate, and often such variations are even semanticized, e.g. *ne pil kon'jaka* [G I] 'drank no cognac', i.e. did not like or appreciate this drink - *ne pil kon'jaku* [G II] is a mere assertion, with no particular attitude toward the referent implied; *količestvo kon'jaka* [G I] 'the quantity of cognac': the quantity here has the semantic nuance of being a property of the referent - *količestvo kon'jaku* [G II] expresses simply a measure, a pure quantification.

When a mass or abstract noun is used in a sentence where it refers to several similar and hence countable entities, the noun is no longer a *singulare tantum*, the singular-plural opposition comes into play (*različnye čai* 'various teas', *vsjačeskie zapaxi* 'all kinds of odors') and the G II loses its validity: *net čaju* [G II] 'there is no tea' but *v prodaže net ni kitajskogo, ni cejlonškogo čaja* [G I] 'neither Chinese nor Ceylonese tea is being sold'; *cvety bez zapaxu* [G II] 'flowers without smell' - *v bukete ne bylo cvetov bez sladkogo ili gor'kogo zapaxa* [G I] 'there were no flowers in the bouquet without a sweet or bitter smell'. Our task here is not so much to describe the details of usage, as to indicate the general tendencies.

A referent in the capacity of a container, bounded area or measurement limits and shapes the content of the utterance. In the **prepositional** use, the G II and the L II indicate that this **function of container or measurement** is the usual, or even the only possible property of the referent. With the prepositions *o*, *pri* the L II cannot be used (*govorit' o berege* [L I], *o króvi* 'to speak about the shore, about blood', *izbuška pri lese* [L I] 'a cottage in the woods'); correspondingly the G II cannot be used with the prepositions *u*, *vozle*, etc. (*u lesa* [G I] 'by the woods', *vozle doma* 'beside the house'), since these prepositions do not indicate a shaping function of the referent. In contrast, the L II can be used with the prepositions *v*, *na* (*v lesú* 'in the woods', *v kroví* 'in the blood', *na beregú* 'on the shore', *na vozú* 'on the cart'), and likewise the G II with the prepositions *iz*, *s*, etc., insofar as these prepositions refer to shaping (or containment, or measurement). G II with the meaning of a container, area, or measurement is an unproductive grammatical form, and its use is restricted to a few frozen constructions, such as, for example, *iz lesu* 'out of the woods', *iz domu* 'out of the house', *s polu* 'from the floor', *s vozu* 'from the cart', especially in designations of measurement: *s času* 'from one o'clock', *bez godu* 'a year less'; in contrast the L II with the corresponding meaning is a current form.

In the event that the L with the preposition *v* does not have to do with a container of some sort of object, but rather with an object having definite properties, the L II is of course not appropriate. Cf. *skol'ko krasoty v lesu* [L II] 'how much beauty there is in the forest', *skol'ko krasoty v lese* [L I] 'how much beauty there is in a forest'; *v stepí* [L II] *menja razdražает moškara* 'in the steppes the midges bother me' - *v stépi* [L I] *menja razdražает odnoobrazie* 'the steppes bother me with their uniformity'; *no i v tení* [L II] *putnik ne našel spasenija* 'but even in the shade the wanderer found no relief' (here the shade functions as the wanderer's container) - *no i v téní* [L I] *putnik no našel spasenija* 'but even the shade brought the wanderer no relief'

(with the shade as a vehicle of relief); *i v grjazi* [L II] *možno najti almaz* 'even in the dirt one can find a diamond' (the dirt encloses the diamond) — *i v grjazi* [L I] *možno najti svoeobraznuju prelest* 'even in dirt one can find a peculiar charm' (that is, the peculiar charm can be a property of dirt).

If the thing contained is felt to be an accident of the container, and the latter is the focus of attention, the L II is prohibited. Cf. *na prudú* [L II] *baby bel'ě pološcut* 'in the pond the women rinse their laundry', *na prudu lodki* 'on the pond there are boats' — *sad zapusčěn, na prude* [L I] *rjaska* 'the garden is desolate, on the pond is duckweed'; *ona pojavilas' v šelkú* [L II] 'she appeared in silk' — *v šelke* [L I] *pojavilas' mol'* 'in the silk moths appeared', *v šelke est' bumažnye volokna* 'in the silk there are cotton threads'; *lepěški ispečeny na međú* [L II] 'cookies baked with honey' — *na mēde* [L I] *pokazalas' plesen'* 'on the honey mold appeared'.

If the type of containment given by the context is unusual for the referent, so that its role in the utterance cannot be restricted to simple containment or statement of area, and we sense that the referent has a certain value of its own, then the L II is not appropriate. Cf. *v lesú* [L II] *ležit tuman* 'in the woods lies a mist' — *na lese* [L I] *ležit tuman* 'on the woods lies a mist'; *v grobú* [L II] *mertvec* 'in the coffin is a corpse' — *na grobe* [L I] *venok* 'on the coffin is a wreath', *v čanú* [L II] 'in the pail' — *na čane* [L I] 'on the pail', *v grjazi* [L II] 'in the dirt' — *na grjazi* [L I] *tonkij sloj snegu* 'on the dirt lies a thin layer of snow'; *sidit voron na dubú* [L II] 'a raven sits on the oak tree' — *otverstie v dube* [L I] 'a cavity in the oak tree'; *na valú* [L II] *našli ostatki ukreplenij* 'on the mound were found remains of fortifications' — *v vale* [L I] *našli ostatki ukreplenij* 'within the mound were found . . . '.

For many nouns, it is sufficient for an attribute to occur in order to force the referent from its role as container. In these instances, too, the L I appears in place of the L II (or the G I in place of the G II). *V grobú* [L II] 'in the coffin', but rather *v derevjannom grobe* [L I], *v razukrašennom grobe* 'in the wooden, in the decorated coffin'; *v peskú* [L II] 'in the sand' — *v zolotom peske* [L I] 'in the golden sand'; *na vozú* [L II] 'on the cart' — *na čudoviščnom voze* [L I] 'on a monstrous cart'; *ruki v krovi* [L II] 'one's hands in blood' — *ruki v čelovečeskoj króvi* [L I] 'one's hands in human blood'; *svin'i kupajutsja v grjazi* [L II] 'pigs bathe in mud' — *bol'noj kupajetsja v celebnoj grjazi* [L I] 'the sick man bathes in "healing dirt" (mud)'; *iz lesu* [G II] 'out of the woods' — *iz tēmnogo lesa* [G I] 'out of the dark woods'. The more unusual the attribute is, the more emphasis it gives to the referent, and the more the L II gives way to the L I. Cf. *v rodnom krajú* [L II] 'in the homeland' — *v èkzotičeskom kraje* [L I] 'in an exotic land'.

## VIII

The following table summarizes the **general system of Russian case oppositions**; for each opposition, the marked case is either to the right of or beneath the unmarked one:


$$\begin{array}{cccc} (N \sim A) \sim (GI \sim GII) & & & \\ \} & \} & \} & \} \\ (I \sim D) \sim (LI \sim LII) & & & \end{array}$$

It is typical of all of these oppositions that the marking is always of a **negative sort**: it lowers the referent in the hierarchy, limiting in some way the full range of its possible development. Thus by the **directional cases** (A, D) the non-independence of the referent is shown; by the **cases of scope** (the G's and L's) the referent's extension is limited; by the **peripheral cases** (I, D and the L's) its peripheral status is indicated; and by the **cases of shaping** (G II, L II) the function of the referent is limited to containment or being contained. The more correlative features a case carries, the more limited and suppressed is the value of its referent in the utterance, and the more complex is the remaining content of the utterance.

Let us therefore attempt to present the Russian case system schematically. As we have seen above, the A denotes "vertical" position, while the N shows merely a single **point** (namely the point of projection of its referent in the utterance). Of the same kind is the relation between the D and the I, but both differ from the first pair by fixing the referent's status as peripheral within the utterance. This **peripheral** status can be schematically represented as the position of a point on a **segment of arc**; for the I, the position of the point's segment with respect to the presumed mid-point (above, beneath, or at the same height) is not actually indicated. The G affirms the existence of two points: on the one hand, the point of projection of its referent on the design of the utterance, and on the other hand, the referent's boundary, which remains outside the content of the utterance; in opposition to the two points indicated by the A, those indicated by the G are not ranked with respect to each other, and thus we can represent the G schematically as the starting-point of a **horizontal** line. The schema for the L differs only in that the point is located on a **segment of arc**, so as to express the peripheral status of the referent. The G II and the L II differ from the G I and the L I in that it is not the referent itself that is indicated, but only its contact with the predication. One of these two is limited by the other. From the point of view of the referent, this point of contact is simply one of its points, and we

give it also as a **point on a horizontal line**, and not as an objective starting point, as we did with the G I and L I. The G II does not tell us which of the two entities – the referent or the content of the utterance – is the shaping and which the shaped; the L II necessarily assigns the shaping function to its referent, since the peripheral position of the point of contact shows the interiority of the content of the utterance.

The general schema of the case system:



## IX

No one declinable word utilizes through its case endings the entire system of Russian case oppositions. Typical are the various aspects of **case syncretism** (cf. Durnovo, 247 ff.). A certain **asymmetry**, which should be viewed as a constitutive factor in the language system (cf. Karcevskij, *Travaux*), is involved in the **general system** of Russian case: the marked series of the scope correlation is portioned differently from the unmarked series – causing sometimes the shaping correlation, sometimes the reference correlation, to function. The shaping opposition is usually avoided (or, seen historically, only a small number of nouns have carried out the split of the G and L into two cases). Nonetheless the asymmetry exists, for in the scope cases (G, L) the directional opposition is eliminated, so that for instance the G can correspond either to the A or the N (*est' kniga* [N] 'there is a book' – *net knigi* [G] 'there is no book'; *vižu knigu* [A] 'I see the book' – *ne vižu knigi* [G] 'I don't see the book'). This asymmetry in the system is reflected in the **asymmetry of individual paradigms** and generalized to the entire declensional system (the Russian conjugational system has similar properties). This is achieved – if we treat the question synchronically – by means of various forms of case syncretism.

If the shaping oppositions or at least one of them (G I - G II or L I - L II) occur in a paradigm, then one of the directional oppositions – that between the N and the A – is eliminated.

sneg		snega	snégu	smex		smexa	smexu
snegom	snégu	snege	snégú	smexom	smexu	smexe	

raj		raja	
raem	ráju	rae	rajú

If the N and A differ, then either the A - G distinction or the corresponding D - L distinction is eliminated.

syn	syna		žena	ženu	ženy
synom	synu	syne	ženoju	žene	

If both distinctions are removed, then the marked members of the directional and scope correlations fall together, and the asymmetry of the system is here in some sense overcome – the only such instance in the written language.<sup>17</sup>

ty	tebja
toboju	tebe

If the scope cases (G and L) merge into a single syncretic form, then at least one of the two series of status correlations, i.e. either those of the full cases or those of the peripheral cases, is reduced to a single special form. The asymmetry remains even if this occurs in both series.

pivnye		pivnyx	slepye	slepyx	te	tex
pivnymi	pivnym		slepymi	slepym	temi	tem
vy	vas		slepaja	slepuju	ta	tu
vami	vam		slepoju	slepoj	toju	toj
myš'			put'		vremja	
myš'ju	myši		putëm	puti	vremenem	
					vremeni	

The oppositions N-G, N-I, and A-D in Russian declension cannot in general be dissolved, but the falling together of the marked members of all three oppositions occurs colloquially in the adjective and most feminine pronouns, since in the colloquial language the instrumental ending *-oju* is replaced everywhere by *-oj*. Here all peripheral cases fall together, and both status and scope correlations merge.<sup>19</sup>

ta	tu	
		toj

slepaja	slepuju	
		slepoj

The merging of the marked members, on the one hand, and of the unmarked members of all three of the above mentioned oppositions, on the other hand, yields the simplest of the Russian paradigms.

sorok	
soroka	

sto	
sta	

poltora	
polutora	

In addition to the paradigms already adduced, the following phenomena show the sharp **contrastiveness of the N** (or of the A, insofar as it falls together with the N) with respect to the peripheral and scope cases:

1. defective pronouns; in particular, on the one hand, isolated nominative forms *nekto* 'someone', *nečto* 'something' and, on the other hand, pronouns with no nominative – the negating *nekogo* [G], *nečego* [G], (*nekomu* [D], *nečemu* [D], etc.), and the reflexive *sebja* [G-A], *sebe* [D], *soboju* [I], which indicates the identity of the non-independent referent with the main subject of discourse and thus can have no N (cf. Polivanov, 87);

2. suppletive pronouns, whose N has a different root morpheme from that of the other cases: *ja* [N] 'I' – *menja* [G-A], *my* [N] 'we' – *nas* [G-A], *on* [N] 'he' – *ego* [G-A], etc.;

3. nouns whose nominative stem differs from the stem-form of the other cases in lacking a "linking morpheme" (see Trubetzkoy, 14): *vremja* [N-A] 'time' – *vremeni* [G-D-L], etc.

4. nouns which have root stress in the N but fixed stress on the ending in the other cases: *gvózdi* [N-A] 'nails' – *gvozděj* [G], *gvozdjám* [D], etc.

In the foregoing investigation I have purposely remained within the bounds of a **purely synchronic** description, although the question of the development of the Russian case system asserts itself automatically: the language allows case forms to fall together with the help of grammatical analogy, and offers no resistance to homonymies in case forms resulting from other forces at work; or it applies analogy in the other direction to maintain old oppositions or create new ones; the basic tendencies of Russian morphological evolution can be most fully understood by the systematic comparison

of a few related systems in the process of change – their convergences and divergences.

Whether we advance from synchrony to a comparative-historical case theory or attempt to integrate the above schema of the modern Russian case system and that of the structure of the verb, into the contemporary study of the totality of the Russian parts of speech and their interrelations, or whether we search, finally, for the principles underlying a typology of case systems (which would, in spite of the diversity among systems, reveal general agreement as to basic laws) – all of this work, if it is to be fruitful, must make a careful **distinction between the various levels of linguistic units**, in particular between two, **the word and the phrase**. It is Brøndal's unassailable and lasting contribution to have stressed forcefully this fundamental distinction. The simplistic notion that **any independent** meaning belongs merely to a unit capable of **one independent use**, and thus, for example, that most cases, abstracted from their surroundings, are nothing but "dead material", has devalued and distorted many morphological problems. I have attempted in this study to liberate several questions of case theory from this erroneous approach. The problem of meaning, which has already – and rightly – been introduced even into phonology, must be granted a more appropriate place in the theory of morphology as well.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. The gradual erosion of the system of case oppositions in most modern Slavic languages, with the exception of the Polish and East Slavic area, plays a role which is not to be underestimated in the evolution of Slavic case theory.

2. It is worth noting that in instances where the case of the noun is unclear the word order is generally fixed, as also when the syntactic relationship follows from the actual meaning of the words; e.g. one can say *syna rodila mat' prošlym letom* 'the mother bore a son last summer', but never *doč' rodila mat'* – 'the daughter bore the mother –', only *say mat' rodila doč'* – 'the mother bore the daughter –'.

3. I believe that in Gothic these cases are opposed to each other in a similar way. The combination of the opposing functions of which Hjelmslev speaks is fundamentally different in the two cases. The N can perform either function; in other words, neither of these functions is specific to its general meaning. On the other hand, the A can unite the functions of both the object and the subject of an action, e.g. in the combination with the infinitive (*hausideduþ ina siukan* = ἡκούσατε αὐτὸν ἠσθενηκέναι 'they heard

that he had become ill' – the entity in the accusative is here equally the object of the experience and the subject of becoming ill), but the object-meaning always remains an indispensable feature of the A, while its auxiliary role as subject is merely one of the syntactic applications of this case. Thus the definition of the A as a case which designates the object of the action embraces all of the particular meanings of the A, and does not require the unjustifiable interpretation of these individual meanings as metonymic usages of the case.

4. The frequent absence of a clear boundary between the individual syntactic meanings of the G has been aptly taken into consideration by F. Trávníček (*Studie*, § 70).

5. Šaxmatov (§ 47) entertains doubts about the origin of this last construction, but Trávníček has correctly recognized the partitive genitive in the corresponding Czech "jakého to zvukú!" 'how noisy it is here!' (*Věty*, 16).

6. In general the partitive genitive, which temporally limits the involvement of its referent in the content of the utterance, is a disappearing archaism. For example the Krylovian "dostali not, basa, al'ta [G]" 'rounded up (temporarily) music, a contrabass, a viola' is nowadays usually misunderstood. Thus, according to Šaxmatov, the G here means "a collection or an indefinite number of objects of the same kind" (§ 425). Thomson claims that this genitive of temporal limitation is "still wholly alive in the domestic speech of many educated people" (XXIX, 250); this is certainly not true for the colloquial language of cultural centers.

7. In Polish the A pl. fell together with the G only in designations of persons, so that the meaning distinction remains almost intact, as the opposition of the A and the partitive G, in this class of names, could have only a limited existence.

8. We have left aside the question of the G with numerals, since it involves a series of striking peculiarities which I hope soon to be able to discuss separately. If the combination numeral + noun has no case marking, the numeral has the syntactic value of a substantivized indicator of quantity, while the accompanying noun functions as a partitive genitive indicating a quantitative limitation on the referent (*pjat'* [N], *sorok*, likewise *skol'ko*, *neskol'ko věder* [G] '5, 40, how many, a few buckets'); if, on the other hand, there is some sort of case marking, the noun carries this marking and the numeral becomes an attributive agreeing with the noun in case (*trěx* [G], *pjati*, *soroka*, likewise *skol'kix*, *neskol'kix věder* [G]; *trěm* [D], *pjati*, etc., *vědrám* D; *tremja* [I] *pjat'ju*, etc. *vědrami* [I], etc.). This does not hold for the numerals for a thousand and above (*tysjača* [N], *tysjači* [G], *tysjače* [D] – *věder* [G] 'a thousand buckets', etc.). The numerals 2-4 do not take a noun in the G pl. but in the G sg. (*dva* [N], *tri*, *četyre vedra* [G] '2, 3, 4 buckets'), as if in this instance the case form did not indicate plurality but only the fact that the scope of the referent as a unit (sg.) does not coincide with the scope of its participation in the content of the expression. In this sense we would have to extend our definition of the general meaning of the G, if we wanted to take into consideration its use with numerals and the quite special status of the latter in the language. We could then claim that the numeral signifies that the last scope exceeds the first, but that the case itself merely indicates the inequality of the two; cf. the gradual progression in the particular meanings of the G: *ni vedra* 'not one bucket', *polvedra* 'half a bucket', *poltora vedra* 'a bucket and a half'. It is noteworthy that those numerals which show by their grammatical form the animacy of their referent, or more exactly their humanness,

always indicate plurality in the noun: *dvoe, pjatero družej* 'two, five friends'; *dvoix, pjateryx družej* [G]; *dvoim, pjaterym druž'jam* [D], etc.

9. Pedersen (134 ff.) furnishes interesting examples of this type of I in Russian.

10. In such constructions as *stal sud'ej* 'he became a judge' the peripheral status is purely semantic, not syntactic: the expression *on stal* necessarily calls for the question *kem* 'who', *čem* 'what' [I].

11. This example from Dostoevskij is cited by Peškovskij (290).

12. The locative after *po* with verbs of remorse, recommended by the school grammarians, is a lifeless archaism.

13. The designation of the inner object is the principal meaning of the A; from the parallel opposition N - I, the principal meaning of the N is shown to be the center of the expression. It is realized as the sentence subject, whereas in the role of predicate the N competes with the I.

14. The pronouns, which, in contrast to the other parts of speech, express not real but formal meanings in their root morpheme, often denote by their root morpheme such semantic differences as are otherwise conveyed as morphological or syntactic oppositions: on the one hand, the categories of animacy and inanimacy (opposition of the root morphemes *k - č*: *kto* 'who' - *čto* 'what', *kogo - čego*, etc.), of person (*ja* 'I', *ty* 'you [sg.]', *on* 'he') and, on the other hand, in highly unusual fashion the opposition of *relatedness vs. unrelatedness to a prepositional construction*, which is consistently expressed in third person pronouns by the distinction *n'* vs. *j* (*nego-ego, nemu-emu* 'he', *než-ež* 'she', etc.).

15. The question has been touched upon recently in Unbegaun's well-documented book on the history of Russian declension; the author follows in essence the conclusions of Šaxmatov, and explains as a tendency "*vers l'adverbialization*" those uses of the G II and L II that Šaxmatov treated from a semantic standpoint as due to the lack of an individualizing meaning (123).

16. On these types, which function as subtypes of *singularia tantum*, see Braun.

17. In the North Great Russian dialects, the asymmetry is leveled in a different way: the directional correlation is eliminated in the plural paradigm.

<i>ruki</i>	<i>ruk</i>
<i>rukam</i>	<i>rukax</i>

18. In the abovementioned North Great Russian dialects, a symmetrical solution is reached in the corresponding instances: no case indicates more than one correlative feature.

full case	<i>bol'sie</i>	<i>bol'six</i>	scope case
peripheral case	<i>bol'sim</i>		

The case forms of the Old Russian dual were distributed in the same way:

N-A	<i>druga</i>	<i>drugu</i>	G-L
I-D	<i>drugoma</i>		

19. In Serbian, all peripheral cases have a common plural form, while all full case distinctions are maintained.

<i>udari</i>	<i>udare</i>	<i>udara</i>
<i>udarima</i>		

In Czech, on the other hand, there exist plural paradigms which retain all of the peripheral case distinctions, but dismantle those of the full cases.

<i>znamení</i>		
<i>znameními</i>	<i>znamením</i>	<i>znameních</i>

This peculiarity of an individual Czech paradigm is repeated, for example, in Gilyak as a property of the general case system:

1. <i>təf</i> 'house'		
2. <i>təfkir</i>	3. <i>təftox</i>	4. <i>təvux</i>

(1. "absolute case", corresponding to the N, A and non-prepositional G of Russian; 2. I; 3. "aditive case", corresponding essentially to the Russian D; 4. "locative-elative case", corresponding to the Russian L and prepositional G.) The same relation obtains in the plural, but here there is a tendency to use the absolute case instead of the peripheral one (see *Jazyki i pis'mennost' narodov severa*, III, 197). A converse relation between the declensions of both numbers is to be observed in the Czech paradigm of *paní* 'woman': in the plural we find the above division, while in the singular the case distinctions are completely neutralized.